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Solon 
-so’lon, n. a famous lawgiver of Athens (594 b.c.),
one of the Seven Sages; a sage; a wisacre.
The past six months have seen elections in countries ofboth Old and New Europe: Italy, the Czech Republic and
Hungary. These recent elections have one factor in common.
None have produced strong, stable governments capable of
bringing about lasting, essential reform. Unfortunately, weak
and timid government is a persistent characteristic across the
EU25.
Hungary has recently witnessed open and sustained
rioting in the streets of Budapest – the worst since 1956 – over
Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany’s admission to lying over
the state of the economy in order to win the elections last
June. Gyurcsany also said his Government had achieved
nothing during its previous four years in power. This is bad
news for Hungary which is plagued by problems that cry out
for good government. Hungary’s deficit is now 10 per cent of
GDP, by far the highest in the EU; the problem has been
greatly exacerbated by Hungary’s poor record in collecting
taxes and other state revenues, and an inability to impose
rigorous checks and controls on state spending.
 In Poland the main governing party, Law and Justice, has
ruled for almost a year in a series of shaky coalitions, due to
the recurrent yet petty feuds which have plagued Law and
Justice and its potential coalition allies, the liberal-
conservative Civic Platform. At the moment, Polish Prime
Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski is trying to cobble yet another
coalition together, with the chances of an early election being
called ever more probable.
A whole host of other problems beset Central and Eastern
European Member States, the majority stemming from the
lack of stable government, which brings with it discontent,
declining competitiveness, sleaze and subversion. However,
the situation in the EU15 is not too far removed.
Italy has had 60 governments since 1945 and the latest
budgetary crisis may well spell the need for another. Romano
Prodi is hamstrung by the demands of Brussels and the terms
of the acquis and his wafer-thin majority in the Senate, which
prevents him from enacting substantial reforms and puts him
at the mercy of the radical elements within the coalition. Italy
badly needs less regulation, greater competition and lower
public spending, but this is highly unlikely under the current
conditions.
The Labour Party in the UK seems more concerned with
the leadership question than the running of the country. Tony
Blair’s announcement in September that he will step down
within 12 months provoked a veritable civil war among the
ranks of Labour – one which may not be resolved until the
leadership itself is. With this in mind, the UK will be lumber-
ed with a weak and divided government for the foreseeable
future. Even when a new leader is in place, it is unlikely he will
command the authority required for strong government.
Jacques Chirac’s authority – or lack thereof – was
epitomised earlier this year over the botched attempts to
implement the youth employment contract. With unemploy-
ment at around 20 per cent for 18 to 25 year olds, France
needs measures to ease labour markets, but the lack of
authority in Chirac’s government, notably by Dominic de
Villepin and the President himself, meant the law was
scrapped.
With large parts of Old and New Europe paralysed by lack
of strong leadership, low economic growth and high
unemployment, is it really the right time to be bringing yet
more members into the club? Bulgaria and Romania – both
predominantly agricultural states – are poor, with incomes
around one-third of the EU average. Although the two
countries are set to join the EU this January, it is patently clear
neither are ready.
This point is implicitly acknowledged in the long list of
safeguard measures which the Commission has imposed
upon the two countries in case either regresses. This is just
another example of how the EU is failing. Rather than
sticking to its guns, the Commission all too often lowers its
‘strict’ accession criteria to accommodate lacklustre attempts
at reform in candidate countries. The inability to enforce
standards at this early stage leaves accession states in an
unstable situation.
A handful of the eight ex-communist countries that joined
the EU in 2004 – namely Hungary and Poland – were not
ready either. This is manifested today by the problems in their
leadership, poor public administration and weak political
structures.
What the EU needs to do now is face up to reality. Many see
the solution to this political malaise as ‘more Europe’: a
Constitution, the extension of QMV, deeper integration and a
final consensus on further enlargement. These are dangerous,
not to say ludicrous, suggestions which will fail and
invariably serve only to worsen the situation.
Old and New – Facing Reality
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from the editor
Dear reader,
The hot topics in EU politics last month were the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, which is
taking place on 1 January, and the problem of over-regulation. The British media was saturated
with stories on John Reid’s plan to curb migrants from the two new Member States and the
overall impact immigration from Eastern Europe is having on British business and employment.
There were also countless stories about how Gordon Brown promises to tackle the red tape issue
and the revelation that, shock horror, the majority of British businesspeople think the EU is
failing and Britain’s relationship should be renegotiated back to a free trade association. Two
serious issues facing British business, but it is only the tip of the EU iceberg, I’m afraid.
Last month, I also had the pleasure of visiting some of our most distinguished Conservative
MEPs who are fighting our corner in Brussels.  It was an enlightening trip, one I aim to make at
least once a year to remind me why I feel the way I do about the EU. Witnessing the Euroland
spectacle firsthand made me proud to be Eurosceptic and proud to question Brussels’ authority.
Whilst in Brussels, I also attended a conference on Croatia hosted by Roger Helmer, MEP, who
has kindly co-authored the lead article on page 5, which looks at the problems facing the country
today. Pages 14 to 18 recount two perspectives on the current status of Gibraltar from Tony Lodge
and Maurice Xiberras. Edward Leigh, MP, examines the possibilities for improving financial
management in the EU on page 12, and Ian Milne comments on two interesting reports of the
costs of EU/eurozone membership on page 8.
If you are up for the journey to Prague, I hope to see you at our conference on 13 November,
which promises to be an extremely interesting event.
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Brussels Takes On New Media
by Oliver Kaye
Why does the Commission exist if notto create regulation? If it did not
over-regulate, then the restaurants and cafés
around the Berlaymont would be out of
business. This is why when Viviane Reding,
Commissioner for Information Society and
Media, and her colleagues in the Com-
mission saw the beginnings of a boom in
new media, they felt uncomfortable leaving
such a large sector unregulated, despite
countless examples of the merits of self-
regulation. The European Parliament and
the Council of Ministers have now been
furiously debating over the last few months
the Television Without Frontiers Directive.
as it increasingly hosts material that can be
considered an ‘economic activity’ and is
making ‘editorial choices’, just a couple of
the criteria required for a broadcaster to fall
under the scope.
The question remains – is such regulation
irrelevant? In many ways, the answer is yes.
The EU, for all it says, cannot effectively
block media services coming in from
outside of the EU. Consumers will still be
served with content broadcast from Amer-
ica or Norway. However, businesses that
might have set up in EU Member States will
now consider relocating elsewhere, taking
investment with them. Other unintended
consequences might be that, for example, if
product placement is banned, European
advertisers will simply place their products
in American programmes, giving contracts
to American sales houses that they know are
going to be shown in the EU. Entire revenue
streams may be lost, adding to Europe’s
relative decline in competitiveness. The
phenomenal pace at which the lucrative
new media, which craves limited regulation,
is moving will leave Europe behind. There
will be no European equivalent to YouTube.
We will be left with a level European playing
field with no European players.
Oliver Kaye is the assistant to Syed Kamall,
MEP for London and ‘shadow rapporteur’ on
the TVWF Directive.
We will be left with a level
European playing field
with no European players
The problem for the EU is that much of
new media is internet based, and the
internet is the ultimate regulation breaker,
in that if regulation becomes too stifling,
businesses can simply move outside the EU.
The best type of regulation is one that
struggles to keep up with technology,
correcting any obvious problematic areas.
The problem for new media is that many
services are being regulated that have not
even been invented yet, stifling these creat-
ive industries before they have a chance to
flourish. What we are seeing here is the EU
looking to regulate one of the areas that
should be a driving force behind the Lisbon
Agenda.
The best example is that of YouTube.
Regulators became aware of YouTube only
after it was bought for £1.6 billion by
internet giant Google. Commission officials
confidently explain that the Directive is
future-proof and that sites such as YouTube
will not fall under the scope of the regu-
lation. It may be true that YouTube does not
today, but what they forget is that the highly
innovative website is currently changing its
business model almost every other month
is even before going into the problems
posed to those who watch programmes on
their mobile phones or computer. This
allows for very limited flexibility to innov-
ate with new advertising techniques, which
will keep up with new technologies such as
TiVo. Again we will see a decline in revenue
streams, which will eventually lead to a dec-
line in the quality of European production,
exactly what the regulators do not want.
A likely outcome of the Directive is that
advertising during children’s programmes
will be banned, as this is deemed to have a
detrimental effect on the development of
children. What many are refusing to hear is
that 66 per cent of revenue from advertising
is invested back into the production of
children’s programmes. Channels will be
left with no option but to broadcast cheaper
Japanese and American cartoons, rather
than European produced programmes.
The problem for new
media is that many
services are being
regulated that have not
even been invented yet,
stifling these creative
industries before they
have a chance to flourish
An underlying theme that runs through
the Television Without Frontiers Directive
is the promotion of ‘European culture’ and
the protection of our moral development
through limits on advertising and product
placement. For example there is a serious
call for adverts not to promote activities
that could be seen as being detrimental to
the environment or to show minors in
dangerous situations. This is a very noble
thought, but surely culture should be
bottom up and not top down, particularly
in the EU. When proposals are put forward
that certain percentages of content must be
European, countries such as Spain and the
UK have every right to believe this to be
unfair as they both have strong rivals out-
side Europe who share the same language,
unlike, for example, Sweden.
The minds of regulators are still very
much set in the broadcasting world where
only limited channels existed. Most don’t
appreciate that today we live in a multi-
platform, multi-channel world, where the
viewer is the ultimate regulator. Even so,
there are strong calls to regulate advertising
and product placement universally across
the EU, particularly from the European
Parliament, including many who are calling
for a complete ban on product placement.
However, many in the EU forget that there is
a world outside of Europe and that it will be
impossible for the EU to block programmes
containing product placement coming in
from the USA or South America.
It is quite possible that the European
Parliament will in future ban broadcasters
from advertising more than once every 45
minutes, as recommended by the Industry
Committee. We should be placing more
faith in market forces; if there are too many
adverts, the viewer will simply change
channel (or with TiVo, fast forward) and
broadcasters will respond accordingly. This
Culture should be bottom
up and not top down,
particularly in the EU
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Croatia at the Crossroads
by Roger Helmer, MEP, and Joel Anand Samy
In 1991 Croatia emerged from thewreckage of the former Yugoslavia. This
small nation of 4.5 million inhabitants is
surrounded by such countries as Hungary,
Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and
the newly formed independent nation state
of Montenegro. Croatia enjoys a 1,000
kilometre coastline on the Adriatic Sea and
is situated across the Adriatic from Italy. The
Greeks, Romans, Venetians, French, Aus-
trians, Hungarians, Italians and Germans
all at one time or another conquered and
ruled over the lands of Croatia.
After World War II, Tito’s Yugoslavia
began as a communist state and later
developed into a ‘socialist nation’. Croatia’s
independence was won after a bloody war
that was fought in the early 1990s during the
break-up of Yugoslavia. During the Balkan
conflict, Croatia suffered heavy losses,
including the lives of innocent civilians and
the destruction of homes, hospitals,
churches and schools. During its quest for
independence, several generals of the
Croatian forces were indicted for war
crimes by the UN’s International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The recent arrest of General Ante Gotovina
was a condition set by the EU to give
Croatia the green light in starting the
arduous process of negotiations to join
Brussels.
Many who witnessed Croatia’s desperate
attempt to cut its ties from Belgrade and
gain independence are surprised at how
swiftly this small nation has allowed
Brussels to begin exerting greater control.
Croatia’s willingness to replace Belgrade
with Brussels remains a mystery. It appears
that the EU incentives dangled in front of
Croatia’s political élite have given them
reason to speed ahead in joining the
European Union. Croatia may be motivated
by security concerns, but these could
easily be resolved by its partnership with
NATO and with international forces on
the ground in Bosnia–Herzegovina and
Kosovo.
At a conference in the European Parliament on 13 October, hosted
by Roger Helmer, MEP, and organised by the free-market think tank
The Adriatic Institute, the parlous state of Croatia’s legal system
came under the spotlight. The conference was attended by
Vesna Škare-Ozbolt, the former Minister of Justice of Croatia, who
was fired in February having upset the old guard by her determined
pursuit of an anti-corruption programme.
6The European Journal Up Front November 2006
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Internal Challenges
Croatia is a picturesque nation with a
pristine coastline and tourists and retirees
flocking to spend their holidays or purchase
real estate, yet there appear to be some
rather unpleasant realities. There is more
than just the turbulence created by waves
crashing on the beaches as the country faces
internal tremors, with widespread corrupt-
ion, increased organised crime activity and
most importantly the lack of an inde-
pendent judiciary. Croatia’s government
appears to cater to crony capitalism and
corruption rather than taking robust
measures in combating these challenges.
A recent article in the European Voice (27
July 2006) written by Edward Lucas, The
Economist’s Central and Eastern Europe
correspondent, caught our attention:
“The [Croatian] authorities have just been
criticized by the International Federation of
Journalists for appointing a number of pol-
itical cronies to the board of HINA, the main
news agency (and that in itself is odd: why
does the state have anything to do with the
media anyway?). Some journalists say that
advertising from state-owned industries is
used to reward friendly media outlets and
withdrawn from critical ones. One local
think-tank compares Ivo Sanader, the
Croatian prime minister, to Vladimir Putin of
Russia. That may be too harsh. But there is an
interesting analogy.
“Just as the top-heavy and incompetent
Russian state survives thanks to the rents
(unearned income) from the country’s oil and
gas wealth, Croatia’s stodgy economy lives off
the rents of tourism. The country scores very
poorly on indexes of economic freedom:
labour laws are restrictive, taxes high, foreign
investment puny.”
Despite protests from within Croatia and
from the international community at large,
the government has gone ahead and
installed its political cronies to the main
news agency. The government’s control and
influence over both state-run and com-
mercial media is disconcerting, as elections
are scheduled for November 2007. Freedom
of speech is regrettably being undermined
in Croatia.
A recent report produced by the Euro-
pean Union, Assessment Mission Croatia,
July 3-7, 2006 – Observations in the field of
the fight against organized crime, unveiled a
range of concerns. One of the most serious
issues is that Croatia is situated on main
smuggling routes (persons, drugs, vehicles,
weapons and explosives) and according to
the investigative report, trafficking in
human beings has significantly increased in
recent years. Routes towards countries of
the Balkan region are also used “to smuggle
synthetic drugs produced in Western Euro-
pean countries, as well as stolen cars.”
The assessment also highlights the
following concerns:
• The traditional forms of organised crime
are still the most significant and common in
Croatia: illegal migration, smuggling of
narcotics, trafficking of arms, counterfeit-
ing of money, etc.. In addition, organised
criminal groups are attempting to use their
illegally gained assets to invest in real estate
and other legitimate business activities.
Thus they manage to legalise their ‘dirty
money’ and make additional profits and can
even present themselves as successful bus-
inessmen.
• There is no official agreement between
the Police and the Croatian National Bank
on the exchange of information on
counterfeited currencies.
• The Republic of Croatia does not yet have
a special strategy for fighting illegal trade
and smuggling of firearms.
EU accession criteria require reforms to
the judicial system, an independent judic-
iary and strategies to combat corruption.
Yet it is worth noting that Bulgaria and
Romania have been allowed to enter
without fulfilling the ‘strict measures’. This
example reflects the EU’s inability to
enforce its own criteria in this area.
Attempts at reform
Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s
administration initially sent a positive
signal to the international community and
foreign investors when it selected Vesna
Škare-Ozbolt as the Minister of Justice after
the 2003 parliamentary elections. Škare-
Ozbolt’s bold judicial reforms and
initiatives to combat corruption began to
make an impact and the results of the two-
year reform campaign are visible in the
World Bank’s 2007 Doing Business Report.
However, the reforms in the judicial
system and the fight against corruption and
organised crime came to a complete halt
when Prime Minister Sanader sacked
Škare-Ozbolt in early 2006. Reformer
Škare-Ozbolt was replaced by Ana Lovrin,
party loyalist and former mayor of Zadar (a
seaside city known for organised crime).
This substitution at the top Justice post later
came under scrutiny by the independent
business weekly, Business HR, for abuse of
power and links to corruption.
In the middle of 2006, the Sanader
administration presented a watered-down
version of anti-corruption strategies that
had first been presented by Škare-Ozbolt,
which included clearly outlined tough goals,
objectives and deadlines for each proposed
measure. The watered-down version scrap-
ped the plan to remove political cronies
from supervisory boards of state owned
companies. Once again, the Croatian gov-
ernment sent the wrong signal by failing to
clearly support a tough anti-corruption
strategies initiative.
The Recent debate
The issues discussed above were recently
debated by Vesna Škare–Ozbolt (Croatian
MP and former Justice Minister), Snjezana
Bagic (State Secretary, Croatian Ministry of
Justice) and Natasha Srdoc (Adriatic
Institute) during an event held in the
European Parliament on 13 October 2006,
which was chaired by Edward Lucas from
The Economist.
The debate showed that Croatia’s justice
system is severely flawed with over 1.4
million backlogged cases in a population of
4.5 million people, has a plethora of
unresolved land registry cases (UK citizens
may wish to take extra precaution and
engage in due diligence when purchasing
property), lacks an independent judiciary
and has a weak state prosecutor’s office.
Furthermore, the debate revealed that
Croatia’s government is experiencing
challenges within the Cabinet – Ministers
and senior MPs are facing corruption
allegations, conflicts of interest cases and
are serving on state owned enterprises
prepared for privatisation.
Such a flawed judicial system combined
with entrenched corruption at the centre of
power does not bode well for Croatia’s
ability to combat corruption and reduce the
influence of organised crime. In fact,
according to The Index of Economic Free-
dom published by The Heritage Foundation
and The Wall Street Journal, international
businesses often require arbitration outside
Croatia rather than using the local courts to
resolve disputes.
The absence of the rule of law and the
lack of an independent judiciary in Croatia
recalls an interesting statement relayed by
Nobel Laureate Dr Milton Friedman when
he reflected on Russia’s privatisation in the
1990s that went awry:
“We have learned about the importance of
private property and the rule of law as a basis
for economic freedom. Just after the Berlin
7November 2006The European Journal Up Front
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Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, I
used to be asked a lot: ‘What do these ex-
communist states have to do in order to
become market economies?’ And I used to
say: ‘You can describe that in three words:
privatize, privatize, privatize.’ But I was
wrong. That wasn’t enough. The example of
Russia shows that. Russia privatized but in a
way that created private monopolies – private
centralized economic controls that replaced
government’s centralized controls. It turns out
that the rule of law is probably more basic
than privatization. Privatization is meaning-
less if you don’t have the rule of law. What
does it mean to privatize if you do not have
security of property, if you can’t use your
property as you want to?” †
Croatia’s government expenditure as a
percentage of GDP is approximately 51 per
cent – the highest in Eastern Europe. 40
per cent of the economy is owned by the
government and further privatisation has
stalled as the government promotes
‘government-private partnerships’ in the
areas of tourism and real estate. With
corruption at an all-time high, observers
are concerned that this new initiative, called
Croatia’s ‘new deal’, will lead to a new wave
of criminal capitalism.
During Prime Minister Sanader’s term,
Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index – which ranks over 150
countries in terms of perceived levels of
corruption, as determined by expert assess-
ments and opinion surveys – concluded
that Croatia had slipped from 59th place in
2003 to 71st in 2005. Moreover, the World
Bank’s Doing Business Report 2007 ranked
Croatia 124th out of 177 nations; this is in
comparison to 2005 where Croatia was
ranked 118th. The World Bank’s report also
places Croatia bottom of its group, Eastern
Europe/Central Asia, alongside Ukraine,
Belarus, Tajikstan and Uzbekistan. Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia
and Montenegro, once perceived as being
behind Croatia and so worse-off, are now
ahead of Croatia.
Brussels-bound?
These statistics and observations on
Croatia undermine its case to join the EU. Is
the European Union prepared to embrace
nations that do not uphold the rule of law?
Will the European Union hold to its strict
criteria that were applied to countries like
Estonia, which is now experiencing a robust
economic growth rate of 12 per cent and
just 30 per cent of government expenditures
as percentage of GDP?
On the other hand, how can the
European Union press nations to reform
when its own institutions are growing more
bureaucratic and where a command and
control structure in Brussels undermines
free markets and liberty? There is much to
be done within the European Union in
pressing forward with reforms and creating
a flexible Europe of nation states, not a
monolithic country called Europe.
Croatia once belonged to such a union
that was called Yugoslavia and all the
nations that were a part of this ‘free trade
zone’ ended up breaking away from
Belgrade’s command and control. There are
striking parallels between the fate of
Yugoslavia and the prospects for the EU.
Advancing liberty, economic freedom,
democracy and prosperity are goals worth
pursuing. Dr Friedman describes this best
in his book, Free to Choose, when he
highlights the importance of economic
freedom:
“Economic freedom is an essential requisite
for political freedom. By enabling people to
coordinate with one another without coercion
or central direction, it reduces the area over
which political power is exercised. In
addition, by dispersing power, the free market
provides an offset to whatever concentration
of political power may arise. The
combination of economic and political power
in the same hands is a sure recipe for
tyranny.”
The United Kingdom has a unique
opportunity to advance reforms within the
European Union and to encourage nations
beyond the EU’s borders to press ahead with
free market reforms based on the rule of law
and protection of property rights. For
Croatia’s hopeful citizens, ‘reforms for the
EU’ should be replaced by ‘free market
reforms for its own future.’ The experiences
of Eastern Europe’s tigers such as Estonia
and Slovakia clearly show the importance of
implementing reforms first.
Such should be the goal of Croatia’s
government: advancing economic freedom
by upholding the rule of law, establishing an
independent judiciary, combating corrupt-
ion and implementing free market reforms.
By striving for growth and prosperity
through reform, both Croatia and Europe
would benefit.
† Source: The meeting of the Economic
Freedom of the World network late in 2001 in
San Francisco, where questions were directed
to Rose and Milton Friedman. The above
quote is part of an edited excerpt from the
discussion – Cato Institute, Washington, DC.
Roger Helmer is a Member of the European
Parliament for the East Midlands and a
member of the European Foundation’s UK
advisory board. Joel Anand Samy is co-
founder of Adriatic Institute for Public Policy
and International Leaders Summit on
Economic Growth and is co-author of Flat
Tax: The Case for Tax Reform in Croatia
with Natasha Srdoc.
Advertisement for the
Adriatic Institute for Public Policy
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More Costs than Benefits
The Conseil d’Analyse Economique is a bit
like a supercharged No 10 Policy Unit. It has
its own permanent staff and its own office
on the Left Bank not far from the Matignon,
the official residence of the Prime Minister.
Its part-time members comprise about 40
of France’s best-known economists from
both the public and the private sectors,
including a couple of dozen university
professors, the director of the INSEE (the
equivalent of our Office for National
Statistics) and mandarins in charge of
departments at the Banque de France and at
various ministries. The President of this
eminent body is the Prime Minister himself,
Dominique de Villepin. This, in short, is a
serious outfit.
The main authors of its report on
Economic Policy & Growth in Europe †  are
Philippe Aghion, a Harvard professor; Elie
Cohen, research director at Sciences-Po;
and Jean Pisani-Ferry, director of the
Bruegel Institute in Belgium and professor
at Paris IX-Dauphine. There are essays by
another ten equally prestigious economists.
The report consists of 300 pages of closely
argued analysis of the EU’s economy:
diagnosis, conclusion and recommend-
ations. At the back is a seven-page summary
in English.
The importance of this report is not so
much in what it says about the EU’s (and
especially the eurozone’s) poor perform-
ance, devastating though it is: many in the
UK have been covering the same ground for
at least a decade. Its significance is that all
this is being articulated and discussed at the
apex of the Europhile politico-economic
establishment of the country which regards
itself as the originator of the European
project: France.
Failure: Diagnosis…
The English summary begins thus:
“… the USA enjoys faster economic
growth than the euro area and … continues
to maintain a higher standard of living … the
following analyses are generally proposed to
explain the persistence of these gaps:
• Europe’s weaker economic performance is
due to Europeans’ preference for leisure as
opposed to work…
• Europe suffers from weaker demand that
may be attributed to a history of restrictive
macroeconomic policies;
• The dominant analysis maintains that
Europe’s growth lag is the result of a com-
bination of incomplete economic integration
and insufficient structural reforms among the
Member States, particularly reforms in
labour, goods and services markets;
• The last explanation is that the problem is
not so much with ‘Europe’, but with Germany,
France and Italy. These countries, unlike the
smaller and faster-growing members, are
unable to make the necessary reforms…
The authors do not systematically reject
the above explanations but feel that no single
one is satisfactory … for the authors,
deficiencies in the EU’s economic policy
system are a main cause of inefficiency and
slower growth…”
In the main text, they explain what they
mean by the “EU’s economic policy system”:
the combination of the division of powers
between the various ‘agents’ (vertically
between Brussels and the Member States,
horizontally between EU institutions); of
the objectives assigned to each of the
‘agents’; of the associated control mechan-
isms; of the procedures of coordination (or
their absence) between ‘agents’; and finally
the recommendations or instructions or
exhortations or signals that the economic
policy leadership addresses to these ‘agents’
(page 25 of the main text). They note that all
attempts at ‘clarifying’ the respective roles of
The Single Market and Single Currency haven’t made any difference,
says official French report
“Europe’s economy’s a failure, and it’s all the fault of the EU system of governance.”
So what’s the solution? “More Europe, naturellement!”
For once, it is not the British who are pointing out the shortfalls of EU membership. Ian Milne takes a look
at two new critical reports. In his first article, he analyses a report by the highly regarded French policy
group Conseil d’Analyse, which is composed of eminent French economists including Dominic de Villepin.
The report finds the situation of the euro ‘perilous’, citing France, Germany and Italy as countries which
are specifically unable to make the necessary reforms, but curiously does not recommend changing the
current institutional framework.
The second report, this time by the Swiss Government, is a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
of EU membership. In his review, Milne focuses on how the Swiss see the impact of EU membership on their
economy and sovereignty; unsurprisingly the current EFTA-style arrangement is preferred in both areas.
EU membership would cost the Swiss almost nine times as much as it does now and would give a voting
weight of just 2.7 per cent in the European Parliament.
The first report serves as a stark warning to the UK and other Member States who have not yet adopted the
euro and the second remains a tantalising reminder of what is in store when, not if, the UK renegotiates her
membership.
Earlier versions of these articles appeared in eurofacts (22 September and 6 October).
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the ‘agents’ have been counter-productive,
and that the system just gets more and more
complicated and confusing. They ack-
nowledge that subsidiarity has turned out
to be a dead duck (page 28). The economic
principles on which the system is con-
structed, as well as the economic signals it
emits, are “dysfunctional” (page 39).
The authors refer to the “disturbing”
conclusions of recent OECD and IMF
studies which point out that when it comes
to market liberalisation, the EU has neither
done more, nor moved faster, than other
developed and less-developed countries
(page 42). They quote Gideon Rachman of
the Economist asking, in 2004, “Is it fair to
give credit to EU institutions for what is a
result of globalisation, and, in the other
direction, is it fair to impose a single
institutional model on all new EU Member
States?” They conclude (page 63) that,
“analysis of structural indicators for markets
in goods, labour and capital do not suggest
that EU membership has had a significant
impact on the nature of or the speed at which
reforms have been carried out. The EU has
simply been part of a wider movement…”
To return to the English summary:
“… no sudden burst in the trade of goods
and services has been observed since the
Single Act entered into effect in 1993, nor
since the euro was introduced in 1999, as was
seen [in North America] after the NAFTA
agreement was signed in 1989. The price
convergence that EU monetary union was
supposed to bring also did not occur, and
convergence even came to a standstill in
1999… The authors believe that these prob-
lems may largely be attributed to the EU’s
institutional shortcomings.”
“Economic integration has stagnated and
no longer promotes growth. The euro’s
creation has not produced the knock-on
benefits expected. The increase in trade has
been relatively modest and financial and
credit markets remain segmented. The single
currency even seems to have had a ‘numbing’
effect on the EU members, which no longer
need to protect against a foreign-exchange
crisis and have become complacent in their
efforts to control spending and make
structural reforms. Moreover, the euro area’s
macroeconomic framework has become
obsolete. Furthermore, the Lisbon strategy
has become bogged down in procedures and
has degenerated into rhetoric.”
On page 268, at the end of her essay on
‘The effects of the euro on trade flows’,
Narcissa Balta (one of the ten auxiliary con-
tributors to the report) observes ruefully
that, “The actual experience of the euro is
the opposite of that predicted by [monetary
union] theory … there is a [minor] positive
impact of the euro on exports from non-
member countries to the eurozone (but not in
the other direction) … it’s as if the euro has
worked as a one-way valve.” [Incidentally,
discussing the unreliability of trade data,
she mentions the ‘Rotterdam (–Antwerp)
Effect’, confirming that this distortion is not
just a British concern.]
Describing the inability of EU politicians
to make up their minds whether they want
to stick to intergovernmentalism or transfer
all essential power to Brussels, the report
observes (page 130):
“Unable to decide on objectives and a
decision-mechanism, Europeans [sic] have
been reduced to multiplying procedures which
take up the energy of civil servants, ministers
and MEPs but fail to engage with the effective
decisions of Member States.”
“We are convinced that the situation we
describe is perilous: the inability of the EU to
revive the economy turns investment away
from the continent; persistent under-employ-
ment and anaemic growth undermine social
provision; and the combination of agonising
economic problems, poorly-managed en-
largement and a manifest exhaustion with
community procedures all threaten to trigger
a vicious circle which will unravel the acquis
communautaire.”
So, what is to be done ?
… but no cure in view.
Given the report’s damning analysis, and its
pinning the blame for the shambles
squarely on EU governance in its widest
sense, the answer is obvious. No doubt it
crossed the minds of the highly intelligent
authors and of the Conseil d’Analyse
Economique as a whole. Dump the said
superstructure and replace it with a
NAFTA-type arrangement which, as the
report acknowledges, actually works.
Such a proposition, coming from the
Prime Minister’s own think tank, less than a
year after the French ‘No’ to the Constitut-
ion, just over a year ahead of the French
presidential election, and overturning the
core 55-year old domestic and foreign
policy of France, would, needless to say,
have been unthinkable. Instead – to quote
again from their English summary –
“… the authors do not however recom-
mend changing the current institutional
framework since they feel that attempting
institutional changes would be costly and not
very realistic…”
And, having brilliantly and conclusively
exposed the cause of the EU’s economic
problems – the EU itself – the authors’
solutions for the EU turn out to be: ‘More
Europe !’
Their recommendations are deployed in
intricate technocratic detail on pages 136–
152. There are three main themes: more
economic integration, (essentially ‘deepen-
ing’ from Brussels); ‘reforming’ the econom-
ic governance of the eurozone (essentially
diluting its anti-inflation policies); and
‘fine-tuning’ the interaction between
‘structural’ policies and macroeconomic
policies. The solutions involve lots more
rules, directives and regulations and the
setting up of even more ‘high-level’ com-
mittees. Without all this, they warn, “Europe
will end up as predicted by Gordon Brown [in
his 2005 pamphlet, Global Europe: Full-
employment Europe’], irrelevant politically
and irrelevant economically.”
One example: control of university
education would be removed from Member
States and run by Brussels, under a
‘European Research Council’, the objective
being to “promote the emergence of ten or
twenty world-level teaching and research
universities” – financed of course by Brus-
sels. This could take some time: Harvard,
the world’s number one, is almost 400 years
old; Cambridge, the world’s number two,
almost 800 years old. And, at page 171, the
report points out that, “The former East
Germany has been heavily subsidised for 15
years with no decisive impact on either its
growth rate or its labour market,” bringing to
mind Keynes’ famous remark: “In the long
term we’ll all be dead.”
Nevertheless,
an excellent report
In spite of the fundamental (but under-
standable) incoherence between diagnosis
and remedy, this is an admirably dense,
thorough and fascinating report. The
bibliography alone cites 120 publications
and covers every significant work on the EU
and the euro in the last thirty years, many of
which have been reviewed or reported on in
these columns. All those concerned in the
UK with the impact of the EU will find
nuggets not just of information, but also of
deep-seated French mindsets which,
however baffling to mere Anglo–Saxons,
underpin much of the projet européen.
If, for example, there are people in the
City who still don’t believe that Paris is
genuinely determined to de-throne London
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 Government Publishes
Cost-Benefit Analysis of EU Membership
At last, a European government haspublished a proper cost-benefit
analysis of EU membership. It comes as no
surprise that the government in question is
not the one that sits (and occasionally
governs) in London. No, the government
concerned is a grown-up one (on matters
European, anyway): the Swiss Federal
Government in Berne.
Their Europe 2006 Report,1 published at
the end of June 2006, is an admirably
serious and comprehensive analysis of the
costs and benefits of EU membership. Apart
from the absence of economic analysis on
the current state (dismal) and future
prospects (dire) of the Single Market, and a
tendency to assume that the EU is self-
evidently a good thing, the report is
remarkably honest. Its language is free of
political correctness: it spells out bluntly
and unequivocally the hundreds of areas in
which Switzerland would lose sovereignty –
yes, sovereignty – if it were ever to join the
EU. (But then Switzerland is just about the
only genuine parliamentary democracy left
in Europe.)
The authors insist that, “Switzerland must
define its … relations with the EU in such a
way as to always be able to defend [Swiss]
interests … Switzerland’s relationship with
the EU must not be considered as a simplistic
‘to join or not to join’ question… It is not so
much a question of whether or not
Switzerland should be a member of the EU,
as of finding the best way and the appropriate
[policy] instruments for the government to
achieve Switzerland’s fundamental goals and
foreign policy objectives.” Quite so.
The authors emphasise that those
“instruments” are not inflexible: “The major
and frequent changes to which the EU, and to
a lesser extent Switzerland, have been subject
on a regular basis, call for a fluid relationship,
both internally and externally. The instru-
ments can therefore be adapted and new and
hitherto untried types of relationship may
emerge. These can also be seen as no more
than stages in an open process, the purpose of
which is to eventually find solutions that will
enable Switzerland to defend its interests
with the greatest chance of success.”
Hence, the report examines a range of
alternatives. These are, broadly:
• to continue the current set of Swiss-EU
bilateral sector-specific agreements;2
• to join the European Economic Area
(EEA);
• to become a full member of the EU.
Costs & Benefits
The report quantifies the ongoing
budgetary cost to Switzerland of each of the
three alternative ‘policy instruments’. These
are summarised in the table. It can be seen
that full EU membership would cost almost
nine times as much as the current system of
bilateral agreements, based on the esti-
mated Swiss gross contribution to the EU
budget, or over six times as much based on
the estimated Swiss net contribution. (The
projected Swiss gross contribution to the
EU, if it joined, would be similar, pro-rata to
its population, to the UK actual gross con-
tribution, which in 2005 was £15 billion).
Joining the EEA would be significantly
more costly than the current Bilateral
Agreements, but still miles less costly than
joining the EU.
Annual Cost to Switzerland
of alternative relationships with EU:
2007-2013
Swiss francs Index
millions
Continue Bilateral Agreements 557 100
Join EEA 737 132
Join EU (net contribution) 3,400 610
Join EU (gross contribution) 4,940 886
The authors point out that these
budgetary costs do not reflect the “dynamic”
knock-on or induced effects of costs – and
benefits – associated with each alternative.
Curiously, they do not cite any of the
numerous reports by the Commission and
others quantifying the current underper-
formance of and the depressing outlook for
the Single Market. They do however state
that, “the negative economic effects (higher
real domestic interest rates on joining the
euro, net contribution to the EU Budget) are
likely in the short and medium term to
outweigh any positive effects resulting from
full Single Market integration.” On the euro,
they note that, “the adoption of the euro has
frequently been associated with higher
prices,” citing opinion polling by the
Commission in November 2005 in which 93
per cent of respondents across the eurozone
said that the advent of the euro had put
prices up.
The “negative economic effects” referred to
above take account of two factors, one of
which is the net contribution to Brussels.
The report also examines in detail the
impact of EU membership and the other
alternatives on the Swiss economy as a
whole and on Swiss-EU trade flows (60 per
cent of Swiss exports go to the EU, and 80
per cent of Swiss imports come from the
EU). It warns, rightly, that such evaluations
are difficult. It notes that EU customs duties
on imports of goods from outside the EU
are almost double Swiss duties, and that EU
minimum VAT rates are higher than Swiss
VAT rates. The raising of Swiss customs
barriers and VAT rates on joining the EU
would have a negative effect on the Swiss
economy. To some extent, those extra costs
would be offset by savings in respect of
Swiss–EU trade, partly resulting from the
reduction at frontier crossing-points of
export and import documentation and
procedures if Switzerland became a full
from its pre-eminent position as the
European financial centre, let them inspect
the evidence set out on page 164, where
Philippe Herzog, a former French MEP and
now professor at Paris-X Nanterre, discus-
ses “the risk [sic !] of a euro-atlantic en-
semble dominated by New York and London”,
and poses the question, in all seriousness:
“Is London’s quasi-monopoly of financial
services good for growth in Europe?”
In the UK, the EU is ‘sold’ to a sceptical
public overwhelmingly on economic
grounds. Here, from the heart of the
French establishment, is the incontrovert-
ible proof that all those EU directives,
regulations, committees, ministerial ‘sum-
mits’, institutions, legal judgements, work-
ing groups – in short, the entire acquis – are,
as far as the economy’s concerned,
pointless. If you can read French, get this
report; if you can’t, get someone who can to
go through it for you.
† Politique Economique et Croissance en
Europe, Aghion, Cohen, Pisani-Ferry, ISBN:
2-11-006149-9, March 2006, available in pdf
at www.cae.gouv.fr; as a paperback from:
La Documentation française, 29-31 quai Voltaire,
75344 Paris Cedex 07, Tel: 00 33 1 40 15 72 30
www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr.
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member of the EU Single Market, partly to
the price-lowering pressure – to the extent
that it actually occurred – from fully
opening Swiss markets to EU imports.
Swiss agriculture, like that in the EU, is
highly-protected, though less-subsidised. In
examining the impact of joining the EU the
report looks at the prospects for the CAP,
including the possibility that the ‘review’
due to take place in 2008 (the one that Mr
Blair accepted in return for giving up a large
part of the British rebate) would actually
result in some ‘reform’. Its conclusions are
pessimistic: “One must not count on any
fundamental change in the present EU
agricultural policy.”
Transferring sovereignty on
joining the EU: Consequences
The report makes no bones about the extent
of the sovereignty that Switzerland would
give up (to Brussels) if it were to join the EU,
and the effect that that would have on Swiss
citizens’ democratic rights, including on the
extraordinary autonomy and independence
that its cantons have enjoyed for centuries.
In return for giving up sovereignty, it says,
Switzerland would be able to participate
fully in EU decision-making. It spells out
what this would boil down to in the
European Parliament: fewer than 20 seats
out of 732, or a voting weight of less than 2.7
per cent.
When it comes to the far more important
forum for EU decision-making, the Council
of Ministers, the report notes that the most
frequently used system of voting is qualified
majority. It states, correctly, that the key
feature of this system as EU enlargement
continues, and as the veto is given up in
more policy areas, is that the bigger
Member States lose influence, as do the
smaller members. (It omits to state that the
result can only be that the permanent EU
bureaucracy, mainly the Commission and
the Court of Justice, gains power.)
The report lists the number of votes that
each of the current 25 members has in the
Council. At this point – humankind can
stand only so much reality after all – the
authors lose their nerve. They can’t quite
bring themselves to spell out just how
insignificant Swiss voting power would be if
it joined the current EU. This reviewer
estimates that the maximum voting weight
the country would get would be 2.7 per cent
– a fairly meagre return for eviscerating
your democracy and imposing on your
economy costs which far outweigh the
benefits.
The Report’s Conclusions
The policy of the Federal Government in
Berne is to join the EU (provided the Swiss
people consent by referendum, which looks
unlikely at the moment). Thus, the appli-
cation to join, lodged by Switzerland in
1992, “has not been withdrawn”. Joining the
EU, says the report, is “considered to be a
long-term option”. Holding out the prospect
of joining eventually as a full member helps
no doubt to persuade Brussels to continue
negotiating further bilateral agreements
with Berne, whose economic leverage vis-à-
vis Brussels is not strong: Switzerland takes
only 5.7 per cent of EU25’s goods exports
(the UK takes 16.4 per cent).
The report concludes that Switzerland’s
interests are best served by continuing to
develop the existing system of bilateral
sector-specific agreements with the EU – so
long as that system allows the country the
freedom of manoeuvre that it has at present.
That freedom is restricted by the ever-
increasing legal and regulatory constraints
of the acquis communautaire, which will
inevitably increase. (It must be said however
that those constraints appear to be felt more
by Swiss politicians than the population as a
whole, who seem not to share their leaders’
enthusiasm for the EU.)
The quantification of costs and benefits
occupies a minor part of the report. Its main
value to non-Swiss readers is in the
extensive description, in great detail, topic
by topic,3  of the EU’s institutional arrange-
ments and policies, and the assessment of
the pros and cons of the present
arrangements between Switzerland and the
EU. The report is the mirror image of what
will be the outcome of exercises currently
being undertaken by those in the UK who
wish to defend British interests by radically
changing the current UK–EU relationship.
1 Europe 2006 Report. The condensed English
version runs to 12 pages; the full report in
French is 157 pages & in German 164 pages.
www.europa.admin.ch
2 Described in Global Britain Briefing Note
No. 36, Nov 2004, Cherry-Picking, www.global
britain.org
3 These include: agriculture; air transport;
competition policy; consumer protection;
currency/monetary union; environment; free
movement of goods, services, capital &
people; immigration & asylum; industrial
products; infrastructure; internal security;
labour market; police & judicial cooperation;
public finances; public health; rail & road
transport; research & development; services;
social security; Swiss direct democracy
(referendums); Swiss federalism (cantons &
federal government); Swiss neutrality; tax.
Ian Milne has been the Director of the cross-
party think tank Global Britain since 1999.
He was founder editor (in 1993) of The
European Journal and the co-founder and
first editor of eurofacts. He is the author of
numerous pamphlets, articles and book
reviews, mainly about the relationship
between the UK and the European Union.
His most recent publications are A Cost Too
Far? (Civitas, July 2004) and Backing the
Wrong Horse (Centre for Policy Studies,
December 2004).
Switzerland and Europe
Switzerland, with a population of 7.2 million, is not a member of the EU but is surrounded on all
sides by EU (and eurozone) countries: Germany, Austria, Italy and France. Around 70 per cent of
Swiss foreign trade is with the EU. (For the UK the comparable proportion is around 40 per
cent.) The Swiss economy exhibits low real growth (averaging 1.7 per cent per year for the
period 1998 – 2007, which happens to be the arithmetic average of the growth rates of its four
EU neighbours over the same period). Switzerland’s GDP per capita was 57 per cent higher than
that of the eurozone in 2004; it has low unemployment, low government borrowing and a high
savings ratio.
Switzerland has been a member of EFTA since 1960. Its fellow-members are Norway, Iceland
& Lichtenstein. It has had a Free Trade Agreement in industrial goods with the EC/EU since 1972.
The Berne Government applied to join the EEA (the European Economic Area, which consists of
EU25 plus Norway, Iceland & Lichtenstein) in 1992, but the Swiss people by referendum refused
their consent. Seven sector-specific bilateral Swiss–EU free trade agreements (Bilateral
Agreements I) came into force in 2002; a further nine (Bilateral Agreements II) in 2004.
Switzerland joined the United Nations in 2002. It has its own seat – and exercises its own vote
– in the World Trade Organization, which is headquartered in Geneva. In line with its policy of
neutrality, which began in 1515 and (except under Napoleon between 1798 and 1812)
continues to this day, Switzerland is not a member of NATO.
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Improving Financial Management in the EU
by Edward Leigh, MP
Those of us who have taken an interestin European affairs over recent years
will be all too familiar with the chorus of
concern that greets the annual report of the
European Court of Auditors. For each of the
last 11 years – by the time this article is
published the Court will have reported
again – the Court has effectively qualified
the accounts of the European Community.
Although the Court has reported some
improvement in recent years, it continues to
point to problems with the legality and
regularity of transactions in key areas of
expenditure such as on Structural Measures
and parts of the Common Agricultural
Policy. This continuing problem has
grabbed attention at the highest political
levels within the European Parliament and
Commission. The Budgetary Control Com-
mittee of the European Parliament has been
very active in pushing for improvement.
And, in January 2005, Jose Manuel Barroso,
President of the European Commission,
made it a strategic objective of his Com-
mission for 2005-06 to strive for a positive
Statement of Assurance.1  Given the scale of
the financial management issues to be
addressed, however, the aims of the Barroso
Commission are, by its own acknowledge-
ment, highly ambitious.
What role has the UK Parliament played
in urging change? The House of Commons’
Committee of Public Accounts, supported
by the work of the Comptroller and Auditor
General, has been very active in this area.
Each year the Comptroller and Auditor
General reports to the Committee on results
of the European Court of Auditors’ work
and the progress being made to achieve
improvement.
In 2005, the Committee of Public
Accounts undertook its own inquiry,
drawing upon the Comptroller and Auditor
General’s report and Committee visits to
the European Court of Auditors in Lux-
embourg, the European Commission and
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF –
L’Office Européen de Lutte Antifraude).
The Committee’s report, Financial Man-
agement of the European Union, published
in April 2005,2  raised a number of
significant issues. We were concerned, given
the size of the European Union’s budget and
the United Kingdom’s contribution to it,
whether sufficient emphasis was given to
the need for sound financial controls and
robust financial management by the
institutions of the European Union.
The Committee noted that accountability
and audit arrangements in the European
Union had been characterised by inertia
amongst its institutions. The high levels of
fraud and irregularity generally thought to
exist in the European Union had damaged
its reputation and the successive years of
qualified accounts had only given credence
to this view.
In our view, trying to obtain a positive
Statement of Assurance on the EC accounts
would be hopeless without dramatic
changes to the Common Agricultural Policy
and the Structural Funds to make them
simple to control, thereby avoiding high
levels of error and fraud.
relationship between the desired outcome
of a particular scheme, the complexity of
the rules governing it, and the con-
sequential likelihood of an error occurring.
Getting a clear picture of whether the
situation is improving or not was not helped
by the difficulty we had in obtaining a clear
indication of the extent of the problems
related to the legality and regularity of
European Union expenditure. We recom-
mended enhancements to the European
Court of Auditors’ annual report to address
this problem: a clearer assessment of
legality and regularity of each of the six
areas of the budget and an indication of
progress compared with the previous year
(both in relation to each of the six expend-
iture headings and each Member State).
In addition to the concerns we expressed
over the qualified audit opinion, the Com-
mittee highlighted the level of irregularities,
including alleged fraud, reported by Mem-
ber States to the European Commission. In
2004, this was €978 million, some five per
cent more than the previous year. We identi-
fied that the precise level of irregularity and
fraud is unknown and difficult to calculate.
This arises for a number of reasons, for
example, Member States report irregular-
ities and fraud in an inconsistent manner.
Trends and progress are therefore difficult
to assess. We supported OLAF’s work in
developing a methodology for estimating
the levels of fraud within individual sectors
of the budget. We understand that OLAF
intends to extend this work to differentiate
between fraud and irregularity.
Whilst we had clear concerns about the
current state of financial management in
the European Union, and the prospects for
improvements, we identified some areas
where the European Commission had made
some progress in improving financial man-
agement. The European Court of Auditors
identified improvements in the quality of
the annual reports intended to enhance the
accountability of each Directorate-General
and that the Commission had made good
progress in designing internal control
systems. We welcomed the introduction of a
new accruals accounting system and the
establishment of an Internal Audit Service.
The Committee also welcomed the
commitment of the Barroso Commission to
move towards a positive Statement of As-
surance as part of the process of enhancing
The degree of complexity that currently
exists is challenging. Expenditure in the
European Union now takes place in 25
countries and across six expenditure
headings. Member States are organised
differently – some have federal structures,
others have autonomous regions, and they
employ different methods for distributing
funds to final beneficiaries such as farmers.
The heterogeneous nature of the Euro-
pean Union can act as a hindrance to sound
financial management.
This organisational complexity is com-
pounded when individual schemes become
complex – making them difficult and costly
for Member States to administer and
frustrating for those at the receiving end
coping with the bureaucracy. Schemes and
programmes, particularly those imple-
mented under the Structural Measures,
have a propensity to lead to a high number
of errors and therefore to qualification. The
Committee drew parallels with the experi-
ence of the UK Department of Work and
Pensions where complex schemes had led to
the Department’s accounts being qualified
in successive years. We recommended that
the European Commission consider the
The heterogeneous nature
of the European Union can
act as a hindrance to
sound financial
management
13
November 2006The European Journal In Depth
Jump to Contents
accountability in the European Union. The
Committee were pleased to see, as part of
this, the introduction by the European
Commission of a roadmap towards a
positive Statement of Assurance. The Com-
mittee looks to the Government to press for
the improvements in financial management
that are an essential pre-requisite for the
European Court of Auditors to provide a
positive Statement of Assurance.
Since the Committee reported, the
European Commission has published an
action plan intended to help improve its
performance. It remains to be seen whether
it achieves its goal of a clear certificate.
In recent months, the House of Lords
European Union Select Committee (Sub-
Committee A) has been conducting an
inquiry into the Management and Audit of
European Community expenditure and
accounts. In evidence to that Committee in
June the Comptroller and Auditor General,
Sir John Bourn, suggested that Member
States might each prepare some form of
consolidated European Union account
bringing together the European Union
money spent in each state. This account
would be prepared according to Inter-
national Accounting Standards and audited
by the national audit office of the country
concerned according to international
auditing standards. The certified account
would be presented to national Parliaments.
In this way different countries would have
to be much more explicit about what they
did with the money they received. This idea
would seem to have much merit, providing
a much clearer focus for seeing what
European taxpayers are getting for their
money. The debate on how best to secure
better financial management in the
European Union looks set to continue.
1 Strategic Objectives 2005-2009, Europe 2010:
A Partnership for European Renewal,
Prosperity and Solidarity.
2 Committee of Public Accounts, Eighteenth
Report of Session 2004-05, HC 498
Edward Leigh is the Conservative Member of
Parliament for Gainsborough and Chairman
of the UK Committee of Public Accounts.
Prodi Power
by Christopher Arkell
In an extraordinary reversal ofprecedent, the European Court of Justice
ruled, in a decision released on 3 October
2006, that Italy’s regional tax (known as
IRAP) does not contravene European law.
The Court’s decision went against two
previous opinions of its Advocate General,
itself a rare event, and against years of
rulings against Member States who have
retained, or attempted to introduce, forms
of turnover taxes in opposition to the
specific rules set out in the Sixth VAT
Directive. The government of Italy, headed
by Romano Prodi, the former President of
the European Commission, no longer faces
the prospect of having to repay £82 billion
to business taxpayers.
Many commentators are puzzled by the
ruling. Jonathan Bridges, senior manager in
the EU Law Group at KPMG, said: “This is a
real surprise and an unprecedented move…
[The] decision is completely contrary to not
just one but two Advocate General’s
Opinions… We did not expect the Court to
overturn the fundamentals of earlier Opin-
ions… It is open to speculation whether the
Court’s interpretation of the rules has been
influenced by the vast sums at stake and
economic difficulties Italy would have had
had the decision gone the other way…”
Bridges has put the matter too delicately,
and it is worth drawing a bolder conclusion.
If the Italian Government were to have lost
the case, and been forced to repay £82
billion, it would have breached its eurozone
budgetary limits, not just this year, but for
an indefinite number of years ahead. The
euro would have come under such strain
that either Italy would have been forced to
withdraw from the currency, or the
exchange value of the currency itself would
have collapsed. It would also have suffered a
huge blow in international confidence.
Alternatively, the Prodi Government would
have been forced to put up other national
taxes, such as income and corporation tax,
by substantial margins which would have
brought about its fall, and a severe deflation
in the Italian economy.
Yet the Italian Government has got away
with it. In this respect, the Prodi connection
cannot be emphasised too much. Prodi is an
academic economist by training; he was
head of several industrial enterprises in
Italy in which the Italian state was a major
shareholder; he is the Italian most favoured
by the European Commission’s grandees
(the permanent heads of the administration
rather than the Commissioners); and he has
excellent relations with Merkel in Germany
and Chirac in France. He has the technical,
political and personal connections to bring
influence to bear on the Court. Though he
will never admit doing so, we do not need
his admission to see the result of his
influence. The Court has decided in Italy’s
favour against its own long line of
precedents and against the opinions of its
own advocate.
The Italian tax in question is specifically
prohibited by the EU Treaties and the Sixth
VAT Directive. These permit one, and only
one, turnover tax – VAT. There is no other
way to interpret the texts involved, and
several other Member States have had their
own turnover taxes overturned. Others are
regularly brought before the ECJ. The UK
itself faces a challenge on its waste disposal
tax (a form of VAT on landfill sites) which it
was previously expected to lose even
though the UK has designed its tax
regulations to fit into the EU’s VAT regime
extremely carefully. Landfill tax not only
generates substantial income for the
Treasury (though nowhere near as much as
Italy’s IRAP), but it supports the environ-
mental policies of the EU. To overturn it,
especially after the IRAP decision, will
demonstrate with astral clarity that the
European Court of Justice is not a court of
law, but a chamber of political convenience.
It will also demonstrate that the UK will
never have any influence whatsoever in the
decisions of the European Union and its
institutions – until it announces its
timetable for withdrawal.
Christopher J. K. Arkell is an accountant
specialising in tax and is Editor of London
Miscellany. He has written extensively on
European issues.
The European Court of
Justice is not a court
of law, but a chamber of
political convenience
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The Gibraltar ‘Deal’
– A Sell Out or Real Progress?
by Tony Lodge
“A Stone in Spain’s Shoe” was how King Juan
Carlos referred to Gibraltar during a State
visit to Britain in the 1980s. The King and
Queen of Spain had even boycotted the
wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana
Spencer in 1981 when they learnt that the
couple would start their honeymoon in
Gibraltar. Set against the long and turbulent
history of Gibraltar’s relations with her
neighbour, a deal has been signed between
the main parties – in Spain – in an attempt
to normalise relations and end this prickly
dispute. Supporters of the deal claim British
sovereignty has not been weakened; its
detractors disagree.
Recent History of the Dispute
It is difficult for many modern Europeans to
understand or comprehend that there is a
corner of the EU where British European
citizens are still struggling to obtain a
number of fundamental rights, which other
EU citizens have taken for granted for over
thirty years. It is a corner of Europe which
has suffered but stood firm against bullying
from its land neighbour, faced down
countless sieges (the last one ended in 1985)
and endured years of guarded support from
its mother country – Great Britain.
Gibraltar is Britain’s last colony in
Europe. This small peninsula, famous for its
huge limestone rock and military history,
represents a community which is both
vibrant and forward-looking. The Gibraltar
finance centre, shipping, tourism and the
Rock’s crucial military importance under-
pins Gibraltar’s quality of life and represents
a community which has acted with
admirable foresight and determination in
light of a declining defence budget and the
need to diversify into other industries.
For years Gibraltar has represented a
diplomatic headache for the Foreign
Ministries in London and Madrid. General
Franco’s decision to close the land frontier
in 1969 condemned Gibraltar to 16 years of
isolation. Franco’s decision to maintain a
blockade by land, sea and air was a response
to Gibraltar’s refusal to give up British
sovereignty (which they have enjoyed since
1704) and come under Spanish rule. A
referendum in 1967 rejected Spain’s ‘offer’
by 12,138 votes against and 44 in favour.
Families were separated and thousands of
Spanish workers were barred from going to
work in the British naval dockyard and
elsewhere, effectively condemned to low
pay and unemployment in Spain.
In 1984 Spain agreed to lift the blockade
in exchange for an agreement, the ‘Brussels
Declaration’, under which the UK would
agree to discuss co-operation with Spain
and the issue of sovereignty whilst making
clear (unilaterally) that no change of
sovereignty could take place unless it
enjoyed majority support in Gibraltar. At
the time Gibraltarians were told that Spain
had to lift its blockade in order to join the
then EEC – Madrid breached the funda-
mental principles of free movement at the
heart of the Treaty of Rome. The land
blockade was lifted but the sea and air
blockade remained.
Set against Spain’s determination to join
the then EEC, the British Government failed
to capitalise on its strong hand and set clear
demands on Spain over Gibraltar. Britain’s
decision not to threaten to veto Spanish
accession to the EEC if Gibraltar relations
were not normalised was a huge oppor-
tunity lost. Either politicians of the period
succumbed to Foreign Office vacillation or
were not aware or made aware of this
opportunity to help Gibraltar.
Consequently, Spain has used its
membership of the EU to impose draconian
and illegal restrictions on Gibraltar. It has
used its veto to block the application of
Community law to Gibraltar. Until 2000 this
state of affairs meant that British Gibral-
tarians were being denied rights as citizens
of the EU simply because it was easier for
Britain to prioritise Spanish concerns and
attempt to secure Spanish support in the
Council of Ministers.
Then Spanish Prime Minister, José María
Aznar, warned Tony Blair in 2001 that he
wanted results in Spain’s favour on
Gibraltar. Blair was prepared to listen and
act. He urgently needed Spanish support in
the EU and was keen to move in tandem
with the Spanish position. Spain was one of
the very few European powers which com-
mitted troops to Iraq and was christened as
being part of ‘New Europe’ by the Ameri-
cans. Blair heralded his special relations
with Spain and Italy.
Blair’s attempt to share the sovereignty of
Gibraltar with Spain was famously defeated
in the November 2002 Referendum. 88 per
cent of the Rock’s voters turned out and
delivered a 98.5 per cent vote against
sharing sovereignty with Spain. This was a
vote organised by the Gibraltar Govern-
ment against the wishes of the Foreign
Office. Their plans for joint rule had been
torpedoed and were in tatters. However,
importantly the then Foreign Secretary,
Jack Straw, had made a Statement to the
House of Commons on 12 July 2002
proclaiming joint sovereignty. Crucially,
this Statement has still not been withdrawn.
The Tripartite Deal –
Cordoba, Spain, September 2006
The arrival of a PSOE socialist Government
in Madrid prompted by the 11 March 2004
terrorist attack changed the mood music
and the approach from Spain. A PSOE
Government had, in 1985, opened the
border which Franco had closed in 1969.
The governments of Spain, Britain and
Gibraltar launched a tripartite forum in
October 2004. It was described as being
outside the Brussels negotiating process,
which is temporarily shelved.
The practical agreements which emerged
in mid-September after two years of
tripartite negotiations have already caused
controversy and stirred opposition on the
Rock. The talks have provided for an
agreement that would allow Gibraltar to be
integrated into European air liberalisation
and permit flights with Spain for the first
time in over 30 years, and gain recognition
by Spain of Gibraltar’s international tele-
phone system and improve cross-border
traffic flows with the establishment of red
and green channels at the frontier. A Span-
ish cultural institute will also be opened in
Gibraltar.
Controversially, the agreement will
require UK taxpayer’s money for Spanish
pensioners who were stopped from entering
and working in Gibraltar when their own
Government closed the border in 1969.
12,000 Spanish workers crossed into Gibral-
tar at this time and many of them have been
campaigning for their pensions since the
gates closed. It is expected to cost the British
Government anywhere between £40 – £60
million to solve the pensions claim. Critics
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have argued that it is extraordinary that
Spain should be rewarded with such vast
sums of money for the consequences on its
own citizens of the restrictions it imposed
on Gibraltar for wishing to remain British.
Their pension contributions were left to
gather interest in a bank until Geoffrey
Howe, as Foreign Secretary in 1984, rather
naively agreed to pay the pensions on the
basis of EU law. When this promise turned
out to cost Britain £180 million plus, the
pension scheme was frozen in 1989. The
pensioners look set to receive their unpaid
increases if the deal is fully implemented.
Gibraltar is a vibrant democracy. The
governing Gibraltar Social Democrats
(GSD) have staked their electoral reput-
ation on the deal which was negotiated by
their leader, the combative Chief Minister,
Peter Caruana. The GSLP/Liberal Oppos-
ition has vowed to block the key elements of
the deal if elected. The new Progressive
Democratic Party (PDP) has also rejected
the Airport Agreement and categorically
stated that if elected in the forthcoming
general election it will also not be bound by
the Agreement.
On the Airport Agreement, the Gibraltar
Opposition GSLP/Liberals argue that it
represents a direct incursion of UK sover-
eignty: “Any question of sovereignty over the
airport, the isthmus or anywhere else is
entirely bilateral between the United King-
dom and Gibraltar alone and has nothing to
do with Spain.” They have argued that with
the building of a new airport terminal
comes crucial problems of jurisdiction and
control. They claim that passengers
departing from Gibraltar would be cleared
by Spanish immigration and customs and
once in the departure lounge would be
treated as in Spain for customs and
immigration purposes. They also claim that
the proposals would require all people
coming in from Spain who were flying to a
Spanish destination to go straight to a
departure lounge without passing through
any Gibraltar customs. One question which
must also be addressed is what classification
would an Iberia flight from Madrid to
Gibraltar carry? Would it be a domestic
flight or an international flight?
The GSD rejects the Opposition’s claims
and argues that the deal, involving
‘enhanced’ use of the airport, sends a strong
message globally to investors that Gibraltar
is moving forward and has dropped the
siege mentality.
The GSLP/Liberals have also argued that
Spain has hardly made concessions to
Gibraltar when it has been widely accepted
that they have been in breach of EU law
anyway – on the free and unhindered
movement of traffic at the frontier, which
they promised to properly address when the
frontier re-opened in 1985.
The Opposition have vowed to block the
key elements of the Agreement and have
declared that they will not be bound by it if
they are elected to office. A general election
is expected in Gibraltar within 12 months,
possibly in the Spring. Joint use of Gibraltar
airport was initially floated in 1987 but was
overwhelmingly opposed by the local
population and dropped. The GSLP Leader,
Joe Bossano, has pointedly asked, “What
would Spaniards think if I were to propose the
joint use of the port of Algeciras?” The GSD
maintain that the airport will remain under
British Ministry of Defence Control and
will not house Spanish customs officials.
The Chief Minister told the Gibraltar
Chamber of Commerce last month, “In one
fell swoop we have cleared the decks of some
of the most thorny and intractable issues
distorting the normality of our lives here in
Gibraltar. Gibraltar cannot condemn itself to
remaining stuck in the siege mode and
mentality of the past.”
Controversially, the Agreement will not
be put to a referendum in the colony,
thereby allowing the other parties the
opportunity to mop up the votes of those
who are opposed to the deal.
The Tripartite Agreement is a huge and
symbolic development in Gibraltar’s unique
evolution. It represents Gibraltar’s coming
of age after years of struggle for recognition
with Spain. She has taken her seat at the
table with her own priorities and objectives,
alongside Britain and her land neighbour.
But the extent to which the deal is a step too
far and a move towards a greater Spanish
dimension in Gibraltar’s affairs is now for
the electorate of the Rock. Only they can
take this decision and the British Foreign
Office should stand aside and cease from
involving itself in an internal democratic
decision.
Tony Lodge is the Vice Chairman of the
Conservative Friends of Gibraltar. He is a
former Editor of the European Journal.
Gibraltar: Swords into Ploughshares?
by Maurice Xiberras
Stalwart defenders of Gibraltar’sBritish sovereignty can rest assured that
the Cordoba Agreement reached by the UK,
Spain and Gibraltar does not signal a British
weakening on the issue.
Nor is there anything in the Agreement
on which to base such a view. If there had
been it would not have stood a ghost of a
chance in Gibraltar, at Westminster or in the
UK at large, where support for British
Gibraltar remains as strong as ever.
Swords will be merely sheathed, in case
they are needed again, politically speaking,
but not turned into ploughshares. Spain
cannot expect any other disposition from
Gibraltar, whilst she maintains her sover-
eignty claim.
Significant Spanish Change
President Zapatero’s socialist Government
would not have risked such major policy
change in Spain’s approach to Gibraltar if he
did not intend to make the Cordoba Agree-
ment work. How significant a change it is
can be judged from the reaction of Spain’s
Opposition, the Partido Popular (PP).
Their leader, Mariano Rajoy has cried
betrayal accusing Miguel Angel Moratinos,
the present Foreign Secretary, of signing an
Agreement that “does nothing about sover-
eignty” and of ditching the common policy
of all his Spanish predecessors in office. His
parliamentary spokesman has said his
compatriots should not be surprised that
Zapatero ‘gifted’ Gibraltar to the British as a
reward for Blair’s help in dealing with the
Basque problem. As they see it, Gibraltar is a
further example of their Government’s
weakness on a whole range of issues, foreign
and domestic, which has polarised Spanish
politics even more than usual.
Yet in a revealing exchange in the Spanish
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee,
former Foreign Minister, the Catalan Josep
Piqué, gave the Agreement that guaranteed
his Party’s qualified support, maintaining
that in office the PP would have followed a
similar policy. Previous methods had not
brought Spanish sovereignty any nearer.
Moratinos commented that if they had
succeeded, they would not still be there
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discussing the issue of Gibraltar. There were
even references to Spanish ‘aspirations’ to
sovereignty, instead of the Spanish ‘claim’,
an indication of movement in the direction
similarly taken by the Republic of Ireland.
Spain, it is clear, has not gone into this
Agreement from a position of strength. For
all the bluster about maintaining their
sovereignty claim, as a ‘policy of State’, the
fact is that Gibraltar’s 2002 Referendum on
Joint Sovereignty laid waste the prospect of
the sovereign powers resolving the issue
above the heads of the Gibraltarians – the
UN route is blocked and, with the defeat of
the European Constitution, by far the most
dangerous threat to Gibraltar lifted.
The Cordoba Agreements
Indeed, the texts of the Agreements ‘do
nothing’ to advance Spain’s claim to sover-
eignty.
The agreement on the Airport, the only
one at issue, is explicitly “understood to be
without prejudice to the respective legal posit-
ions with regard to the dispute over sover-
eignty and jurisdiction over the territory in
which the airport is situated.”
This ‘without prejudice’ formula is not a
new one. It was already around in the late Sir
Joshua Hassan’s day (Gibraltar’s pater
patriae) and as he used to say, not without
controversy then, it allowed Spain to keep
her claim, whilst we kept Gibraltar.
What made it difficult to implement then
was the persistence of an active policy
of harassment aimed at strangulating, and
later emasculating, Gibraltar through a pol-
icy of restrictions against Gibraltar’s eco-
nomy. This was coupled with an unrelenting
political campaign against Government and
people which, having started in 1954 with
the visit of HM the Queen, reached its climax
in the closure of the land frontier and the
withdrawal of Spanish labour (1969), and
did not stop with the death of Franco (1975)
and the opening of the frontier in 1985.
It is this policy of harassment as the
instrument for the ‘recovery’ of sovereignty
that Zapatero has forsaken by the Cordoba
Agreement and has outraged Rajoy. Mora-
tinos still repeats over and over that his
country’s sovereignty claim stands, to the
annoyance of the Gibraltarians. But he
insists that Spain will be pursuing it through
economic cooperation with Gibraltar in the
economic interest of the whole geograph-
ical region and in the hope that it will
facilitate a solution to the ‘sovereignty issue’.
Many in Spain still believe, however, that
surrendering the leverage of sanctions and
pressure means giving up on sovereignty – a
de facto acceptance of an indefinitely British
Gibraltar, including the isthmus, and see
Moratinos’ protestations to the contrary as
a de iure fig leaf to cover up this de facto
recognition.
Gibraltar Opinion
In Gibraltar, there is some division of opin-
ion. Opposition Leader Joe Bossano has
refrained from condemning the Agreement
outright but added that he would not be
bound to implement its ‘bad parts’. These
include what the Agreement terms ‘an
administrative’ arrangement allowing pass-
engers ‘in transit’ within the Schengen Area
to avoid Gibraltar customs and immigration
checks; 50 per cent commercial par-
ticipation by a Spanish concern in the
operation of the single terminal on British
soil; and the setting up in Gibraltar of a
Spanish ‘Cervantes Institute’ on a site
provided by the Gibraltar Government with
a Spanish flag being allowed to fly from the
premises.
It is significant that Bossano has not
challenged the “sovereignty, jurisdiction and
control” free nature of the Agreement. But
with a general election imminent, it is
logical that he should not embrace the
Agreement wholesale.
Every Gibraltarian would argue that the
restrictions should have been withdrawn as
unilaterally as they were imposed – a
morally unassailable argument. Spain, they
argue, has conceded nothing that she
should have had in the first place.
A more realistic majority, however,
knows that without negotiation Spanish
policy would have remained unchanged
indefinitely, whilst a few wish no recon-
ciliation at all with Spain.
Gibraltar is not the only long-standing
dispute in the world where the prospect of
‘peace’ divides and excites opinion at a
political or popular level. A strain is placed
on political responsibility, now greater in
the highly charged party political atmo-
sphere of an impending general election, on
which the fate of the Agreement may hang.
It has the declared support of the Trade
Unions, commercial organisations and
other representative bodies. But there is a
popular view that the Agreement is the
beginning of the end for British Gibraltar
and should be de-railed.
Spanish ‘Concessions’
In this climate therefore it may not be politic
to talk about Spanish ‘concessions’ at
Cordoba. But by the Agreement, Spain has
finally accepted Gibraltar’s DDT (350) free-
ing up expansion of telecommunications
and making possible ‘roaming’ mobile
agreements, much needed by Gibraltar’s
burgeoning finance centre. She has
undertaken to liberalise cross-border traffic
consistent with her Schengen customs
obligations. Gibraltar’s exclusion from EU
‘Open Skies’ legislation, engineered by
Spain, will be reversed within six months on
the joint submission of the UK and Spain,
and over-flight of Spanish territory will
come into operation making straight-on
approaches over Gibraltar Bay possible and
more safe. Gibraltar will become an
‘international airport’, from which Spain is
not excluded, with a single terminal on
British soil with access from either side of
the frontier.
If these are not ‘concessions’, they are
certainly ‘climb-downs’ or ‘reversals of
policy’, even if the policy aim continues to
be stated. Involving as they do international
organisations – the EU, NATO, ICAO etc. –
they may be greeted with some polite
clearing of throats, or from a different
perspective, some relief (the European
Commission has already issued a gushing
statement of welcome). From a Gibraltar
perspective, registering these ‘changes’
internationally will make their reversal
more difficult, though not impossible, with
a change of Government in Spain – a good
reason not to turn swords into ploughshares
just yet.
The de facto Political and
Economic Balance
Important as these ‘concessions’ are, the
significance of the Cordoba Agreement is, I
would argue, political in a broader sense. It
marks a shift in the underlying political
dialectic between Gibraltar on one hand,
and the UK and Spain on the other –
decidedly in Gibraltar’s favour.
The 1987 Airport Agreement, for
example, was the creature of the infamous
Brussels Agreement, whereby the two sover-
eign powers agreed to negotiate sovereignty
bilaterally, as a condition for the opening of
the border and the lifting of restrictions.
The outcome was predetermined – the
transfer of Gibraltar to Spain. The naval
dockyard had been turned to commercial
use, and the economy was in tatters.
Explaining why he accepted the ‘bilateral-
ism’ of Brussels, then Chief Minister, Sir
Joshua Hassan, wrote to his biographers
after the event:
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“The economy was at its lowest; the
prospects were very bad; it was a decision I
had to take myself… The full opening of the
frontier was a sheer necessity to survive.”
(Hassan letter of 5 October 1994 quoted by
Jackson and Cantos, p. 258)
That Airport Agreement was signed by
Geoffrey Howe and Fernandez Ordonez. In
terms, language and staging of implement-
ation it was a disgrace for the Gibraltarians,
who amid demonstrations and by their
refusal to approve necessary legislation in
the House of Assembly, brought it down.
The Brussels Agreement has not been
withdrawn, but ‘bilateralism’ has been
rendered inoperative. In a letter from the
UK Secretary of State to Gibraltar and to his
Spanish counterpart, the UK Government
has stated that no meetings under it will
take place unless the Gibraltar Government
is ‘content’ with such a meeting, an essential
assurance formally repeated in the UN’s
Fourth Committee (a policy applied also to
the Falklands recently).
Gibraltar’s Chief Minister will by
definition continue to be a constituent
participant in the Tripartite Forum, which
produced Cordoba. He will continue to
have the power of veto over all decisions.
The Forum’s agenda will be ‘open’ – a policy
agreed by both Government and Oppos-
ition in Gibraltar. Thus in complete contrast
to the Blair Government’s shameful Joint
Sovereignty agreement with Spain,
devastatingly rejected and defeated by
Gibraltar’s 2002 Referendum, all discussion,
negotiation and agreement will be tripartite
and not bilateral. Spain’s insistence that
sovereignty is a ‘bilateral’ issue is more a
safeguard against the Gibraltar Government
claiming Gibraltar sovereignty, than
entertaining any prospect that sovereignty
will be taken completely out of Gibraltar’s
hands. ‘Bilateralism’ is incompatible with
the level of Gibraltar representation in the
Forum, and the new Spanish policy of
cooperation depends in the continued
existence of the Forum.
The new Gibraltar
Constitution
Gibraltar’s negotiations with the UK
Government on the new Constitution have
run ‘parallel’ to the trilateral negotiations,
but there is no doubt that, whist denying
Spain any locus standi in agreeing
Gibraltar’s Constitution, there have no
doubt been significant points of contact
between the two.
To an interested observer, the major
stumbling block to constitutional agree-
ment was Bossano’s insistence on the
unqualified and continuing right to self-
determination figuring in the text or in the
new preamble, and not unconnectedly, that
the whole exercise should result in de-
colonisation and the de-listing of Gibraltar
by the UN as a colony. This would have
given Gibraltar the right to independence at
some time in the future with the approval of
the UK. Although all political parties stand
for self-determination in the above sense, all
maintain that the choice of independence is
‘academic’, since none want it at present.
It became clear, though officially denied,
that Madrid would not sign any co-
operation Agreement until the Constitution
was agreed. Inclusion of the offending right
would in Madrid’s view breach the Treaty of
Utrecht (1713) by which Gibraltar was
ceded to the English Crown.
That this adherence to Utrecht was also
the long-established and oft-repeated view
of all UK governments did not seem
relevant to Bossano. Whereas the rest of the
Gibraltar delegation was prepared have
their reservation on self-determination
recorded in the constitutional ‘Despatch’,
Bossano threatened to oppose the new
Constitution in the ‘decolonising’ refer-
endum to follow. In real terms, if the
Constitution foundered, the Cordoba
Agreement would have been at best
postponed and at worst wrecked.
Eventually Geoff Hoon produced a
formula, which did enough for Bossano: the
constitutional referendum would be an
exercise of the right of self-determination,
but the Despatch firmly reiterated the UK
Government’s adherence to Utrecht and
explicitly ruled out independence in the
future without Spain’s agreement. The new
Constitution was rated ‘non-colonial’ by
Peter Caruana and Geoff Hoon. Bossano
agreed to support it on that basis.
The Treaty of Utrecht
Dea ex Machina
It is a supreme irony that the 300 year-old
Treaty is intensely disliked by many
Gibraltarians – not because it gave Britain
possession in perpetuity, but because of its
reversion of the sovereignty to Spain clause,
if Britain surrendered it. Its anachronistic
and insulting prohibition of the presence of
Jews and Arabs in Gibraltar, now obviously
a dead letter, and its curtailment of the right
of self-determination, should hold the key
to the whole situation and make possible
agreement on both issues.
Spain has swallowed what she calls this
“internal right of self-determination,” though
she still balks at it being recognised by the
UN as an act whereby Gibraltar is removed
from the colonies list.
Hoon’s formula and Spain’s acquiescence
make one thing clear. Britain will not be
midwife to such an independent state of
Gibraltar, and Spain will fight it to the last.
As Thomas D. Grant argued in his excellent
article, ‘Gibraltar on the Rocks’, (Policy Re-
view no 116), rebus sic stantibus will be a
powerful consideration in the foreign
policy of existing nation states when weigh-
ing up the political future of such enclaves,
from Gibraltar to Taiwan. In the times in
which we all now live, geo-political con-
siderations are hugely important.
Faute de mieux, therefore, the Treaty of
Utrecht serves the UK and Spain’s purpose
of denying an independent mini-state of
Gibraltar, even if the Gibraltarians wanted
one. But thought must be given to its re-
negotiation in terms which do not exclude
the people of Gibraltar. Utrecht serves no
other useful purpose than pre-empting the
independence of Gibraltar.
The Principle of Consent
It goes without saying that any weakening
of the UK Government’s position – any
regression to undeliverable 2002 policies –
will spell the end of this new phase. Almost
40 years later, the Preamble to the 1969
Constitution will be re-iterated in the new
Constitution.
I believe that Spain has got the message
that, whatever aberration seized the UK
Government in 2002, the wishes of the
people of Gibraltar will not be dishonoured
by Britain; they are a reality that no one can
ignore. To the dismay of the Spanish Op-
position, the present Spanish Government
has purposively attacked many aspects of
the Francoist state, in the name of freedom,
democracy and the principle of consent.
The slate must also be wiped clean of
Franco’s policy of attrition against the
people of Gibraltar in the name of the same
values.
Moratinos himself is on record as saying
that Spain could not impose a solution on
Gibraltar. But for as long as the Spanish
claim endures, even the most civilising of
influences will be regarded by the
Gibraltarians with a measure of suspicion.
Spain’s formal acceptance of the principle
of consent seems to me to be the next,
though not the final, objective of UK/
Gibraltar diplomacy.
18
The European Journal In Depth November 2006
Jump to Contents
Peter Caruana
That such a small place like Gibraltar should
throw up issues of such complexity for all
involved is not new. What is new is that two
‘parallel’, but not unrelated, agreements
should have been struck simultaneously. All
three participants have shown a high degree
of political courage and diplomacy, but
none more than Gibraltar’s Chief Minister.
Peter Caruna has delivered a new ‘non-
colonial’ Constitution, with which the
majority of his fellow citizens appear to
concur, and a ‘cooperation’ Agreement, free
of Spanish sovereignty, jurisdiction and
control, on economic terms that are greatly
beneficial to Gibraltar.
In the context of Anglo–Spanish relat-
ions, it marks the political and economic
ascendancy of British Gibraltar and effect-
ive recognition by Spain that ‘possession is
nine tenths of the law’, the other tenth still
to be fought for. Swords, which politically-
speaking past generations in Gibraltar, at
Westminster and in the UK generally, have
had to wield in earnest, are not going to be
turned into ploughshares just yet.
In typically British fashion, there is no
guarantee that Caruana will be Gibraltar’s
Chief Minister in a year’s time. But the
Agreement is not re-negotiable, and the UK,
Spain and the EU have the vested interest of
maintaining good relations and the stability
of the region, this time not at the expense of
the people of Gibraltar.
Maurice Xiberras is a former Deputy Chief
Minister and Leader of the Opposition in
Gibraltar and was a member of the UK
delegation in talks with the Spanish Foreign
Secretary under the Strasbourg Process in the
1970s. 
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Of Fog and Funny Statistics
by Don Anderson
This journal published my Appraisalof our membership of the EU in
August. I have also been sending it to
politicians on all sides of the House, in the
hope that they would think hard about how
they are representing us. William Hague
riposted by sending me a printout of his
recent speech on the subject. He wants the
UK to be participating energetically in an
open, flexible Europe and to be leading it in
an about-face turn from its current path of
integration, over-regulation, protectionism
and economic stagnation, so that it might
stand some slight chance of competing with
the emerging powerhouses of China and
India. Worthy thoughts indeed, but it is
laughable to think that he might be in any
way more successful in bringing about this
pie in the sky than any of his predecessors
have been. He might as well try pushing a
pea up Highgate Hill with his nose, as divert
the EU from its obsession with gumming
up its own works to the point of solidifi-
cation.
Open and flexible? The EU has 39,000
bureaucrats working to keep it hidebound
and ever more complex. Hague quoted a
European Commission report, Ten Years
Without Frontiers, as his authority for
claiming that the Single Market makes a
contribution to GDP worth £20 billion
annually to Britain, and an annual increase
to a European household of £3,800. This
seemed so ludicrously untrue to me (I
couldn’t imagine why he had accepted and
regurgitated it) that I made an effort to look
it up. It was easy enough to find the
document and I started to read. Then I
started to speed-read. Eventually my eyes
glazed over, my mind went into meltdown
and I gave up. But I had discovered the
secret of the EU bureaucrats. They spew out
such incredible masses of stultifyingly
boring jargon that no Minister or MEP
could possibly comprehend what machin-
ations are afoot, and heaven help the
ordinary Joe who might want to know.
The Commissioners might be the ones
who set things in motion, but plainly it is the
39,000 who create this sheer mass of anal
retentive nit-picking that not even an
educated person can read without his mind
going into refusal. Thus is the indigestible
porridge speed-voted through the
European Parliament by bemused MEPs
and delivered by the lorry-load to Whitehall
where its diktats are industriously gold-
plated, just to be on the safe side. This
illuminates the irreconcilable difference
between the continental mindset based on
the Napoleonic system, where everything is
forbidden unless it is specifically permitted
by law (and preferably licensed), and ours
which is the reverse way about.
This accounts for why the proposed
Constitution was 50 times longer than that
of America (which works better), and ours,
which we haven’t even considered necessary
to write down. Moses delivered economical
one-liners such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’,
which are still the most powerful edicts of
all.
I am none the wiser as to how we can
simultaneously be £3,800 per household
better off, yet worse off by the £119 million a
week we know EU membership costs the
British taxpayers, after allowing for the
return of some of our money in ‘grants’. If
you divide this by the number of house-
holds and multiply by 52, each one is worse
off by some £450 p.a. On top of this direct
tax, we pay over the odds for food because
of the CAP/CFP (which is reported to add
some £1,500 to a household’s food bill), the
highest cost for fuel and many com-
modities, the cost of housing and support
for immigrants, the cost of EU regulation
estimated at £20 billion that industry has to
pass on, and the huge increase in the public
sector and their pensions. A further cost,
which is not generally taken into account, is
the loss of the opportunity to enter into
trade agreements in the world outside the
EU, where countries afford each other the
same benefits as we get in the EU trading
bloc, but without the tariffs and few of the
costs.
I suspect some propagandist in the Com-
mission has divided the increase in overall
GDP by ‘x’ number of households over
some convenient period and, perhaps using
a Slovakian farmer as a low datum point,
calculated this sum as an average across the
EU. This would obliterate any difference
between the effect on households in net
contributor nations and in the nations
benefiting from our enforced charity.
Neither am I convinced that fluctuations in
GDP can be said to affect households like
mine where the occupants are retired and,
therefore, an average gives a totally mis-
leading picture.
I have a feeling that this is the sort of
misinformation the Labour leaders used to
trot out –“There are 3 million jobs dependent
on our membership of the EU,” they’d say, as
if it were a statistic. This figure was based on
an academic study which employed indices,
projections and guesswork, and would only
have any relevance whatsoever to jobs in the
event that UK–EU trade were to suddenly
cease. It was therefore just political scare
mongering. The GDP would similarly be
unaffected unless we were to cut off
business relations with the Single Market.
How can any government complacently
accept the continual letting of our lifeblood,
for no discernable benefit other than as a
licence for self-important popinjays to
attend conferences on lavish expenses, and
mop up ‘hospitality’? When will they take
notice of the recent cost/benefit analyses
carried out by four authoritative bodies into
our relationship with the EU, none of which
concludes that we derive any significant
economic benefit at all?
We shouldn’t have to live our lives
regulated by the burdensome complexity
being churned out by Brussels. A fog so
dense that not even a constitutional lawyer
can be sure he has mastered it, or a
compliance officer be confident that his
company is not transgressing the law. On
airfields, in the old days, we knew that the
only way of dispersing fog was to light a fire
under it.
Mr Hague should acknowledge that it is
not remotely possible that powers over
social regulation and employment can be
retrieved, especially under a leader who was
unable to deliver on the only pledge he
made. Very few of our electorate are in
favour of EU membership, and the rest feel
that our political classes are out of touch –
and letting us down. The excuse that they
were elected in order to show leadership can
only be argued up to the point where the
ignoring of popular feeling becomes
betrayal.
Don Anderson is a retired company director,
who worked in the advertising industry for 40
years.
Our political classes are out
of touch and letting us down
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The Year Ahead
by Dan Hamilton
A New Year, a New Leader
2007, unlike 2006, looks set to be an
interesting year for the European Union.
January 2007 will see Hans–Gert Poet-
tering step down from the position he has
held since 1999 as President of the
European People’s Party group to take up
the presidency of the Parliament.
Poettering, who has been described by
even hardened Eurosceptics like Daniel
Hannan as “fair-minded”, would have to put
in genuine effort to perform as badly in the
President’s Chair as the incumbent.
The socialist, former Spanish Treasury
Secretary, Josep Borrell Fontelles’ abrasive
style has angered Eurosceptics and dedi-
cated pro-Europeans alike. His blunders
include the incorrect assertion that no
Nordic countries were involved in World
War II and the suggestion that EU policies
towards the Ukraine have succeeded in spite
of opposition from Poland and Lithuania
“acting under US influence” !
With Poettering’s accession to the
presidency of the European Parliament, the
EPP will be in need of a new President. This
is, on the face of it, a great opportunity for
the ailing group.
Will they endorse a reforming figure
such as the Swede Gunnar Hokmark or
the dashing Dutch MEP Camiel Eurlings
who, despite their enthusiasm for a federal
Europe, broadly share the Conservative
Party’s commitment to internal market
reform and liberalisation? Will the group
bow to pressure and accept that the
European Constitution really is dead? Will
Member State ‘red lines’ on foreign, defence
and currency policy be embraced and
safeguarded? Will the group become a
champion for reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy?
The answer to all of these questions is –
quelle surprise – “non”.
Eurosceptics wanting the Conservative
Party to break away from the federalist EPP
grouping could not have wished for a better
successor to Mr Poettering than Joseph
Daul, the Strasbourg-based sugar beet
farmer who appears to be a lock for the job.
First elected in 1999, he has shown little
enthusiasm in his current job as Chairman
of the Agriculture Committee for reform of
the ailing Common Agricultural Policy,
which still accounts for around half of the
EU’s annual expenditure, and fought the
last European elections on a platform of
opposing Turkish membership of the EU.
At a time when the European Union is so
badly in need of reform, Daul is a bizarre
choice to say the least.
The US Dimension
With the United States Congressional
elections of 7 November drawing ever-
closer, the Democrats are certain to seize
control of the House of Representatives,
with the prospect of the Party gaining the
Senate appearing to be an ever-increasing
possibility. Whilst the incumbent Republi-
can leadership of the House and Senate can
barely be described as friends of those in
the European Union seeking to encourage
freer trade – one only need remember the
Steel tariffs imposed by Congress in 2002 –
the Democrats can only generously be
labelled as enemies of the cause. Amongst
those free-trade advocates facing near-
certain defeat include Rep. Tom Reynolds,
Chairman of the Republican Congressional
Committee, and Senator Mike DeWine.
Reynolds’ likely replacement, 75 year old
industrialist Jack Davis, has declared he will
“fight to cancel all free trade agreements”
whilst DeWine’s vanquisher, north-eastern
Ohio steel-belt Congressman Sherrod
Brown has penned a book entitled The
Myths of Free Trade in which he rallies
against the “follies” of globalisation.
Whilst time will tell whether the
incoming leadership will entirely follow the
Davis/Brown dogma on trade policy,
Democratic control in 2007 will certainly
mean a return to the imposition of EU/US
manufacturing and agricultural tariffs and
increased pressure for the US to withdraw
from the World Trade Organization. The
change of leadership will not mean free-
marketeers have lost an ally in the form of a
Republican-controlled Congress, but we
will certainly be mourning the death of a
critical friend.
New additions
The real test for 2007 is, of course, the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the
European Union amid genuine scepticism
about the commitment of both countries to
eliminating internal corruption and imple-
menting market reforms.
Romania, in particular, has an oppor-
tunity to establish itself as a leading force in
the future of the European Union. As the
seventh largest Member State, the country’s
proximity to Asia and aspiring accession
states such as Serbia, the Ukraine and Tur-
key is highly significant. How the reforming
Liberal Prime Minister Calin Popescu
Tariceanu chooses to use this influence will
be significant. Will he be a genuine advocate
for reform of the European Union’s
outdated institutions or will he, in the style
of the Kaczynski brothers, fail to live up to
his initial promise?
For those believing in market liberalis-
ation and EU reform, 2007 will be a year of
new and immense challenges. Prepare
yourself.
Dan Hamilton is a member of the
Conservative Way Forward Executive
Committee. He can be reached at
mail@danhamilton.co.uk.
… news in brief
As relations deteriorate between Russia and Georgia, a member of the
Georgian opposition has denounced the ‘political terror’ which, she
says, the government there is pursuing. Irina Sarishvili, who leads the
Imeda movement and the Khena anti-fascist coalition, told journalists
at a news conference in Moscow that Georgia has effectively been a
dictatorship since the ‘Rose Revolution’ brought President Mikheil
Saakashvili to power in early 2004. “The Saakashvili regime has widely
practiced political terror, including through murders,” she said. “Death
squads, directly subordinate to the dictator and his associates, are still
operating in the country… Besides ordinary citizens atrociously killed
by Interior Ministry officers, the circumstances of the death of Georgian
Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania remain uninvestigated, and other
citizens – members of parliament and the Tbilisi city assembly, political
opponents of the regime – have been killed or brutally beaten.” “I don’t
approve of the current relations between Russia and Georgia,” she said, “I
belong to a political group that believes that Russia and Georgia are
being driven to a conflict by the West.” [RIA Novosti, 5 October 2006]
21
November 2006The European Journal Intelligence Digest
Jump to Contents
Intelligence Digest
by John Laughland
Stoiber attacks European Arrest Warrant
The Prime Minister of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, has attacked the
Government of Angela Merkel for failing to insert any safeguards into
the proposed EU Arrest Warrant following the accession of Romania
and Bulgaria. Stoiber has said that the justice systems of both
countries should be specifically barred from being able to demand
the extradition of German citizens to their countries, as the EU Arrest
Warrant allows. He has said that protective clauses should be inserted
to prevent this because organised crime and corruption have a
considerable influence over both judicial systems. The European
Union has itself said that the justice systems in both countries remain
corrupt because it has inserted clauses into the accession treaties
which allow financial penalties to be inflicted on the two states if their
‘reforms’ are judged insufficient. “I demand that our citizens be
protected from deficiencies in the rule of law, corruption and organised
crime in Bulgaria and Romania by means of special clauses,” Stoiber
told Die Welt. The German Government says that it has inserted
protective clauses but Stoiber responds that these must come into
force as soon as the two countries join, i.e. in January. “I cannot and
will not accept that German citizens can be imprisoned in these
countries,” says Stoiber. [Die Welt, 24 October 2006]
EU–Russia meeting goes badly
The summit meeting held in Finland on 20 October between the
Russian President and the heads of state and government of the
European Union has not led to an agreement on energy policy. The
EU has been trying to get Russia to sign an ‘energy charter’ since 1994
but Russia fears that it will permit foreigners to take control of its
energy sector. EU leaders claimed that they wanted good relations
with Russia but they did everything to undermine them, accusing
Russia of protectionism and human rights abuses. Putin’s patience
snapped at one moment, when he was faced with a question about
corruption in Russia. He said that the word ‘Mafia’ came from Italy
and that Spain was currently facing a huge corruption crisis as mayors
from all parties were being imprisoned for graft.
Prior to the summit, the President of the European Commission,
José Manuel Barroso, called for the EU to adopt a unified energy
policy. “We must speak with one voice when negotiating with third
parties,” he said. This is diplomat-speak for attacking the bilateral
agreement reached between Germany and Russia by the previous
German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder to build a pipeline under the
Baltic Sea, i.e. bypassing Poland, a project which the Polish Defence
Minister, Radek Sikorski, has likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
between Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR in 1939. Mr Schröder, who
lost last year’s election, is now the head of the consortium building the
pipeline. Since expressing their dissatisfaction with German policy,
however, the twins who govern Poland have toned down their
rhetoric, perhaps because they understand that the German
presidency of the EU starts in January and that it will aim to
determine the future of EU energy policy and of policy towards
Russia. [Célia Chauffour, Le Monde, 20 October 2006]
On 25 October, the European Parliament formally requested that
the EU place democracy, human rights and freedom of expression “at
the centre of any new agreement” on future partnership with Russia.
This resolution goes against what President Chirac said during the
EU–Russia summit in Finland, when he declared that, “There is no
question of linking moral actions with economic actions.” The
resolution made reference to the murder of the campaigning
journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, calling on the Russian authorities to
undertake an independent inquiry into it. Speaking to the MEPs, the
Finnish Prime Minister, Matti Vanhanen, admitted that the dinner
with Mr Putin had been rather tense. “It is true, it was very frank and
open but we in Finland have a long tradition of open discussions with
Russia,” he said. (In fact, of course, during the Cold War, Finland was
often excoriated for its supine attitude towards the Soviet Union.)
[Philippe Ricard, Le Monde, 27 October 2006]
Hungarian opposition TV station fined
As 130 people were injured as police fired tear gas and rubber bullets
at demonstrators during the ceremonies to mark the 50th annivers-
ary of the Hungarian uprising against Soviet rule, the country’s
official media watchdog has imposed a 1 million forint fine (about
£2,500) on a TV station owned by the country’s main opposition
party, Fidesz. This is the largest fine to date imposed by the body.
According to the watchdog, Hír TV’s broadcasts about riots on 18
September were biased, in particular because they allegedly
attempted to “present the incidents as revolutionary events and spoke of
a new ’56 and did not inform viewers objectively and factually.” During
those riots, the building of the state television station, MTV, was
attacked by protesters. Press freedom has been a constant bone of
contention between the Hungarian parties since the end of
communism. Supporters of Fidesz argue that the left-wing parties
have harassed their media when in office, only to complain loudly to
international organisations when the unfair advantages enjoyed by
their outlets are curtailed while in opposition. [Budapest Sun, 19
October 2006]
Turkish accession could founder on Cyprus
Experts are speculating that the negotiations between the EU and
Turkey could collapse over the Cyprus question. In an interview with
an Austrian newspaper, Heinz Kramer, a political scientist who
specialises in the EU’s foreign policy, has said that he does not think
that the Finnish presidency’s current proposals will succeed in
breaking out of the current impasse created by Turkey’s refusal to take
certain measures on trade with Cyprus which would amount to a
near-recognition of the Greek Government as the legitimate
government of the whole island. Kramer says that he fears the latest
proposals are merely a way of hiding the fact that the negotiation is
not advancing, since Cyprus has said clearly that it will not allow
matters to proceed until Turkey recognises it. Kramer claims that a
majority of the EU Member States is against Turkish accession but
that none of them dares to take responsibility for torpedoing the
negotiations – not even the Greek Cypriots. [Der Standard, 24
October 2006]
Chirac apologises to Erdogan
The French President has telephoned the Turkish Prime Minister to
present his apologies for a vote in the French Parliament calling for
denial of the Armenian genocide to be criminalised. The vote, which
resulted from a bill put down by a Socialist deputy, will be an
enormous obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the EU. Mr Erdogan said
that Chirac had called him on 14 October to express his regrets and
that he had promised to do all he could on the issue in the future.
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President Chirac has said that he was opposed to the measure during
a visit to Armenia on 30 September. Recalling that France had
recognised the Armenian genocide in 2001, Chirac said that the new
text resulted more from polemics than from judicial reality. Chirac
had added, however, that Turkey would be “well advised” to recognise
the genocide since that would facilitate its entry into the EU. The vote
in the French Parliament criminalising denial of the genocide caused
a huge outcry in Turkey, with Prime Minister Erdogan saying that it
was “shameful, a black stain on freedom of expression.” The Turkish
Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, said that the law would profoundly
damage Franco–Turkish relations and he expressed the hope that
French politicians would prevent the bill from entering definitely into
law. [Natalie Nougayrède, Le Monde, 17 October 2006]
Dutch elections on Europe
More than a year after the Netherlands voted against the European
Constitution, the country is preparing for a general election on
22 November. The various parties seem to have agreed amongst
themselves not to raise the European issue during the campaign: the
leaders of all the main parties campaigned for a ‘Yes’ vote. In this
campaign, they are keeping quiet or calling for ‘reforms’ in the EU.
They are also keeping quiet about the question of Turkish accession,
since popular opposition to Turkey was one of the main reasons why
the Dutch voted against the Constitution (which the party leaders
presented as essential for EU enlargement). The issue of Turkish
membership has nonetheless arisen during the campaign since
candidates of Turkish origin from two mainstream parties have been
struck off their respective party lists because they have refused to
recognise the genocide of Armenians in Turkey in 1915. The issue of
the genocide arose when a small Protestant party put down a bill in
the Dutch Parliament which would have made denial of the Armenian
genocide a crime, just as the French National Assembly has recently
done. Feelings are running high in the 370,000 Turkish community in
Holland, as they are among ordinary Dutch people, who shocked at
the double-murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh, the latter by
a Muslim extremist. The Muslim issue was also at the centre of a
scandal involving a Dutch MP from Somalia, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a friend
of Van Gogh’s, who was threatened with expulsion from the Nether-
lands after it appeared that she had lied about being persecuted by
Islamists in her home country in order to obtain Dutch citizenship.
[Jean-Pierre Stroobants, Le Monde, 18 October 2006]
Lepper back in government
The anti-EU Self-Defence Party has been reintegrated into the
governing coalition in Poland twenty-five days after leaving it. On 21
September, the Prime Minister, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, sacked the head
of Self-Defence, Andrzej Lepper, who had protested against the 2007
budget and against sending 900 extra Polish soldiers to Afghanistan.
But on 16 October this decision was rescinded and Lepper has been
brought back into the fold. Thus early elections have been avoided.
[Célia Chauffour, Le Monde, 18 October 2006]
EU Constitution on track
The chairman of the European Parliament’s Constitution Committee,
the German Socialist, Jo Leinen, has suggested that France and the
Netherlands vote again on the European Constitution, which they
both rejected in referenda last year. Citing the precedents of Denmark
and Ireland, both of which voted again (respectively, on Maastricht
and Nice) after having got the answer ‘wrong’ in 1992 and 2001,
Leinen says that the same approach could be adopted for France and
the Netherlands. “It could be,” he says, “that the price which will have to
be paid will be that the new treaty is not called ‘a constitution’ any more
but ‘a Europe treaty’. The goal of having an actual constitution may
have to be postponed and we may have to be satisfied with a basic treaty
instead.” Leinen claims that the absence of this treaty or constitution is
the reason why Europe is under-performing in energy policy, the war
on terror, the fight against illegal immigration, the fight against
organised crime and many other areas. He says that the upcoming
German presidency should work towards a consensus in 2007 and
that corrections and amendments to the old text should be agreed
upon by 2008, by which time a new ratification process could begin.
Leinen says that he wants the new treaty to be ratified by referendum
– but by a single referendum taking place simultaneously across the
whole of Europe, and that the ‘majority’ should be of voters as well as
of states. (This would be tantamount to destroying national
sovereignty before the vote had even taken place.) Leinen said it was
quite wrong for the will of “the majority” to be thwarted by ‘No’ votes
in “one or two states.” Asked whether he thought there should be a
referendum in Austria, where anti-European feeling is among the
highest in the EU, Leinen said that there should be no popular vote
since the Constitution had already been ratified by the country’s
Parliament. [Der Standard, 20 October 2006]
At a meeting of the heads of Socialist parliamentary groups in
Europe, the French Socialists were in a minority of one when they said
that the Constitution had to be abandoned. Whether they had been in
favour or against it at the time, they all agreed with Jean–Marc
Ayrault, President of the French Socialist group in the National
Assembly, who said, “It is not possible to make our citizens vote again
on the same text.” By contrast, all the representatives of all the other
Socialist groups, especially those from countries that have actually
ratified the Constitution, said they want to press on. They refuse to
accept that the Constitution is now a dead letter. Leinen said, “It is very
dangerous to say that the treaty is dead” – even though Germany itself
has not ratified the Constitution since, although it was approved by
the German Parliament, it has been successfully stalled by an appeal
by anti-Constitution campaigners to the Federal Constitutional
Court. One Spanish socialist, Carlos Carnero, shouted at his French
colleagues, “You cannot impose your national debate on the rest of us in
Europe! This is not the 1950s!” A Portuguese MEP said that the third
part of the Constitution was the most important, even though it was
this part, its political content, which was most hotly contested by the
opponents of the Constitution in France. Robert Badinter, the French
constitutional expert, reminded the audience that the Constitution’s
own text stipulated that, subject to ratification, it would enter into
force on 1 November 2006. “That is the Day of the Dead!” interjected a
Luxembourg deputy. [Jean-Dominique Merchet, Libération, 20
October 2006]
Hans-Peter Martin’s battle with OLAF continues
The battle between the anti-corruption MEP, Hans-Peter Martin, and
the EU Commission’s so-called anti-corruption unit, OLAF, continue.
Although OLAF is supposed to fight corruption, it has in fact been
persecuting Hans-Peter Martin ever since he took up his one-man
battle against institutionalised graft in the EU. OLAF has accused
Martin of misusing €190,000 of money from his secretarial budget
and it has sent its claims to the Austrian authorities with a view to
encouraging them to investigate the matter further. Martin, who has
legal immunity as a Member of the European Parliament, has
virulently rejected the claims of any irregularities, accusing OLAF of
conducting a witch-hunt against him and denouncing its accusation
as “a joke” and “a farce”. [Der Standard, 12 & 19 October 2006]
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Merkel online
The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has used the internet to
present her policies for the German presidency of the EU which starts
on 1 January 2007. Since June, she has been posting a brief video
message on www.bundeskanzlerin.de and in her message of 7
October she devoted the podcast to the EU. She listed five priorities
for bringing Europe closer to its citizens and, referring to the 50th
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, said that Europeans had to rally
around their ‘common values’. However, she remained coy about the
politically sensitive issue of Turkish membership, saying only that
there would be no further enlargement for a while. She said that
Europe needed ‘a constitutional treaty’, confirming thereby that she
remains attached to her well-known goal of reviving the defunct text.
She also repeated a lot of bromides about improving Europe’s
competitivity.
Italian spooks ‘knew about CIA kidnapping’
Not only did the Italian secret services know about the CIA’s plans to
kidnap the Egyptian cleric, Abu Omar, in a hit which occurred on the
streets of Milan in 2003, but they also participated in the operation.
This is the firm belief of the prosecutors who concluded their
investigation into the affair on 7 October. The report names eight
agents of SISMI, the Italian security services, including the chief,
Nicolo Pollari, and his deputy. The prosecuting magistrates claim that
Pollari knew about the operation and agreed to help out. Abu Omar,
an imam in a Milan mosque, was suspected of links to Al-Qaida and
was kidnapped on 17 February 2003. He was taken to the American
air base at Aviano and on to Ramstein in Germany, another US base,
from where he was flown to Egypt. He claims that he was tortured
there. Four other Italians are under investigation for complicity in the
affair: two journalists from the daily, Libero, and two SISMI agents
who tapped the phones of journalists from La Repubblica.
Claudio Scajola, chairman of the committee which controls the
secret services, has said that Enrico Micheli, the Deputy Minister with
responsibility for the services, declared the matter ‘a state secret’ in
response to the committee’s questions on whether the Italian author-
ities knew about the kidnapping plan. By making this declaration, the
Prodi Government is continuing the policy of state secrecy imposed
by the Berlusconi Government which it succeeded. [Corriere della
sera, 25 October 2006]
Spain & Portugal for common immigration policy
Lisbon and Madrid have said that they want to see the EU adopt a
common policy on immigration. Both countries are under pressure
from a huge influx of refugees from Africa, more than 23,000 of which
have landed on the coast of Spain since January. Speaking on 20
September at a joint press conference in Lisbon, the Spanish and
Portuguese Europe Ministers said that solidarity and cohesion were
‘fundamental’ EU values and that this meant that all EU states had to
share the burdens their countries were carrying. The same appeal had
already been made by the French Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy,
who on 15 September said that the unanimity rule had to be
abandoned where immigration was concerned, i.e. that the national
veto had to be dropped, but he criticised the decision of Spain in 2005
and Italy in 2002 to legalise hundreds of thousands of illegal
immigrants, saying that this had only encouraged the traffickers. [Le
Monde, 21 September 2006]
Yushchenko? Who’s he?
Following the victory of his rival, Viktor Yanukovich, in the recent
general election, the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, ‘hero’ of
the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’, has been marginalised from Ukrainian
politics. At the height of the crisis, indeed, the West pressurised
Ukraine into a radical change to its Constitution. The result of the
change was that most of the President’s powers were taken away from
his office and given to the Prime Minister instead. Now that
Yanukovich has become Prime Minister, it is he, not Yushchenko, who
really runs Ukraine. The result is that the man whom the Western
media pushed forward as the most popular politician since John F.
Kennedy has in fact slumped into the nobody he always was. And the
result of that is that few Ukrainians even care any more when he turns
up at public functions. On the occasion of a visit to Kiev by the
American film director, Steven Spielberg – who is making a
documentary of the massacre of Jews by the Nazis in 1941 –
Yushchenko turned up unexpectedly for the première – and few
people even recognised him. [Agence France Presse, 20 October 2006;
Le Monde, 23 October 2006]
Public support for Yushchenko has now fallen to 9.5 per cent in the
opinion polls. Five of his allies in government have resigned. At the
same time, Mr Yanukovich seems to be repairing his country’s
damaged relations with Russia. On the occasion of a visit to Kiev by
the Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, Yanukovich indicated
that the two countries were on the way to resolving their differences
over the price of gas. Yanukovich said that the events of winter 2005-
2006 (when the gas supply was temporarily cut off because Ukraine
refused to pay the bill and was accused of siphoning off transit gas)
had brought the question of gas supplies to “a high level of politicis-
ation” but that things had now stabilised and that this stability was
what the Ukrainian economy needed. He also gave guarantees that
transit arrangements would be respected. “We will certainly guarantee
stable volumes and look to it that the gas transportation system should
be operating and our partners in the European Union should not
experience the discomfort they experienced last winter,” Yanukovich
said. For his part, the Russian premier said that gas price rises were
not on the agenda in their bilateral discussions. The prospect of a
continuing gas war seems therefore to have been averted. [Itar-Tass,
24 October 2006]
Peacekeepers
The German Foreign Minister, Frank–Walter Steinmeier, has said he
was deeply shocked by the “disgusting” photographs published in the
German press which show German soldiers in Afghanistan
desecrating human skulls. Germany has a large contingent of soldiers
in Afghanistan as part of the international military force there and
their presence has been a matter of considerable controversy in a
country unused (since the end of the Second World War) to sending
its soldiers into active combat. The pictures were taken in early 2003
during a patrol in the Kabul area and published in the mass
circulation Bild newspaper. The soldiers in question have been
identified and are being prosecuted. The pictures show a soldier
about to stick wire through a skull as if to hang it up; another shows a
soldier with his penis in his left hand and the skull in his right; a third
shows the skull on a tank. It is not clear whether the skull is of an
Afghan or perhaps a Soviet soldier from the 1979 occupation. The
German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung, said that this kind of
behaviour was totally unacceptable and that it represented the direct
opposite of what the German army in Afghanistan is supposed to
stand for. [Bild-Zeitung, 25 October 2006]
Lustration in Poland
On 18 October, the Polish Parliament voted for a new law on
lustration. According to the new law, an affidavit (or denunciation)
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can be submitted to the Institute for National Memory against
members of Parliament, members of the Government and of the civil
service, executives in state companies, local politicians, prosecutors,
head masters and mistresses, university rectors and journalists, if
they collaborated with the Communist secret police. A successful
denunciation can lead to a person losing his job. The law also enlarges
the definition of ‘agent’ by referring not to ‘secret collaborators’ but to
‘personal sources’. This new definition could include people who were
approached for information by the secret police but who did not
necessarily work for them. The Kaczynski twins are opposed to
opening all the Institute’s archives; the law has to be signed by the
President, Lech Kaczynski, for it to enter into force. He has fifteen days
to sign it or send it to the constitutional court for review. [Célia
Chauffour, Le Monde,25 October 2006]
French judge their politicians severely
60 per cent of French people – according to a poll – think that their
politicians are ‘generally corrupt’ but only 24 per cent firmly condemn
their dishonesty. In other words, they are more intransigent about
their politicians in theory than in practice. The 60 per cent figure
contrasts with the 38 per cent who thought their politicians ‘generally
corrupt’ in 1977. In 1991, the figure was 65 per cent. 78 per cent say
that their ministers are corrupt; 69.1 per cent think that the President
of the Republic is corrupt; 68 per cent for deputies to the National
Assembly. 84.9 per cent think that the courts are too soft on ministers
and 78.1 per cent think that they are too soft on national deputies. 56
per cent think that mayors are treated too lightly. 96.5 per cent say
they would not vote for a politician who had been implicated in a
financial scandal even if he was very effective. However, this apparent
severity in their judgements contrasts with the answers to other
questions. 72.3 per cent say there is little or nothing wrong with going
to see a deputy to obtain a place for one’s child in a crèche; 70.2 per
cent say there is nothing wrong soliciting a deputy to find a job for a
friend. Even taking out membership of a political party only in order
to obtain social housing is considered all right by 49 per cent of those
asked. [Le Figaro, 20 October 2006]
France implicated in Rwanda genocide
A committee has been set up in Kigali, Rwanda, officially charged
with “collecting proof about France’s role in the genocide” which took
place in 1994. Composed of historians and jurists, the committee is
supposed to hear the testimony of 25 witnesses in the first week. It will
then pursue its investigations abroad and produce a report in six
months’ time. According to the committee chairman, Jean de Dieu
Mucyo, a former Minister of Justice, “the report will determine whether
or not a judicial procedure should be undertaken at the International
Court of Justice.” Situated in a room near to the office of the Prime
Minister, the committee’s first witnesses were Jacques Bihozagara, one
of the leaders of the RPF rebellion (the RPF is the party which
currently holds power in Rwanda) who was Ambassador of Rwanda
to France after the genocide, and Augustin Iyamulemye, a Senator
who was a senior officer in the Rwandan secret services from 1993 to
1994.
It will also hear testimony from people who lived in the zone where
the military-humanitarian operation ‘Turquoise’ was launched by
France three months after the genocide started. In his hearing,
Ambassador Bihozagara attacked France for having “organised a
campaign to denigrate and demonise the RPF” and for then having
“protected those who committed genocide.” He then attacked France for
having “preached the existence of a double genocide” (i.e. of Hutus by
Tutsis as well as the other way around). The Quai d’Orsay has said that
it has not been approached by this committee and that France will
cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
There are cases currently before the French military courts alleging
complicity in genocide and a senior judge is conducting an
investigation into the attack in April 1994 against the aircraft which
was carrying the Rwandan President, Juvenal Habyarimana. [Le
Figaro, 25 October 2006]
German immigrant workers in Ireland
An association of German builders has been created in order to
promote their services in Ireland. The ‘German Crafts Association’
has been set up by builders in Hessen and the Rhineland Palatinate to
market the skills of German carpenters, painters and builders in
Ireland. The construction industry has been booming in Ireland for
ages but, according to the Germans, many of the builders there are not
qualified. The Germans are intending to market their reputation for
high quality work, and to ensure that, when a builder puts in a
cupboard, the door shuts or when a wall is painted it is done so
smoothly. The German builders had a stand at the recent Irish
Building Exhibition and they claim that there was huge interest. One
of the specialities that the Germans are marketing is in building
houses which are economic in their consumption of energy. This is
expected to be popular in a country in which energy prices have
doubled in recent years. [Laura Stoll, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
25 October 2006]
Russia reluctant on Kosovo independence
Russia is in disagreement with the other Western members of the
Contact Group on Kosovo about whether the province should be
made formally independent of Serbia. The USA, France, Italy and
Germany want to suggest to the Security Council that Kosovo be
made independent, even though Belgrade is strongly opposed to this.
Moscow, however, wants to continue negotiations so that a result is
found which is acceptable to both sides. In the middle of September,
Russia had indicated that it would veto a resolution on independence.
[N. Mappes-Niediek, Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 October 2006] Many
Russians resent the Western pressure for independence for Kosovo,
especially when those same Westerners are opposed to independence
by Transnistria, a secessionist province of Moldova which has fewer
historical ties with Moldova than Kosovo does with Serbia. The issue
is further complicated by the fact that the Bosnian Serbs would like to
declare independence from Bosnia–Herzegovina. The Western-
backed High Representative who governs Bosnia, however, has said
that any referendum on independence would be null and void. Other
politicians in Bosnia who have campaigned for more autonomy, for
instance the former Bosnian Croat leader, Ante Jelavic, have been
imprisoned for anti-constitutional activities.
EU decides not to legislate on alcohol
The European Commission has abandoned plans to force alcohol
producers to label bottles with health warnings similar to the ones
they have imposed on cigarette packets. It has decided instead to
encourage the Member States to take their own measures against
alcohol abuse. It had been suggested that the EU would require beer
and wine bottles to carry health warnings, or that the EU should
introduce its own system for licensing alcohol outlets. These
proposals met with a storm of protest, not least in Germany. The
health Commissar, Markos Kyprianou, expressed frustration and
anger at what he said was “the aggressiveness of the lobby campaign
waged by part of the alcohol industry against our strategy.” [Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 October 2006]
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JANUARY 1995
to
MAY 1997
By the beginning of 1995, Euroscepticfactions had been ‘combat trained’.1
Structures were in place and had been used
well in the past. Metaphorical ideological
trenches had also been dug around the issue
of Europe. The combination of conviction,
experience and energy were potent
weapons that organisations were not afraid
to deploy to pursue their aims. With the
general election approaching rapidly, an
assault for control of the Conservative Party
had begun.
As was his way, John Major continued to
follow an attempted policy of compromise
with sceptics over the first half of the year.
On 3 February 1995, at a Conservative Way
Forward (CWF) dinner, the Prime Minister
diplomatically stated that, “we will aim for
a more flexible European Union… Nor will
we agree to a more prescriptive, centralist
Europe, or removal of the nation states’
veto.” 2 The most pivotal meeting with
Eurosceptics, however, occurred on 12 June
when Major agreed to address Fresh Start,
with Michael Spicer in the Chair. This event
soon descended into a slagging match with
Major “heckled and interrupted.” 3 He saw
the meeting “as rigged as a scaffold” with
attacks rehearsed.4 Overall, “the meeting was
a disaster.” 5 Desperate times now called for
desperate action.
Ten days later, on 22 June, Major,
believing himself to be in “a coalition
government of my own,” 6 announced his
resignation with the intention to stand for
re-election. This was a direct call for his
opponents “to put up or shut up.” 7 It was
clear that he was referring to sceptics when
stating “for the last three years I’ve been
opposed by a small minority in our party.” 8
However, this alleged ‘small minority’ was
sufficiently large to run their own candidate
– No Turning Back member John Redwood.
Akin to the preparations made for votes
on Europe, Redwood’s campaign had been
planned months in advance.9 In May, the
‘whipless nine’ were returned to the fold
without conditions, which was both “gullible
and foolish.” 10 Leading figures, such as
Gorman, Gill and Marlow regrouped and
emerged as the ‘whippers-in’ for Redwood.11
The Impact of British Eurosceptic Groups 1990-97
In the last of a 3-part series, John Mehrzad investigates the major players in British Euroscepticism.
Major may have viewed them as “the barmy
army” 12 but the sceptics had built a team
round more than oddballs. The Bruges
Group “was there full time” providing
resources, expertise into different ideas of
policy and Martin Holmes became the
former Minister’s European Policy Advis-
or.13 Some of the Tory press also endorsed
Redwood. The Daily Mail was unhelpful to
Major, The Times was gunning for a dream
Heseltine-Portillo run-off, while Simon
Heffer at the Daily Telegraph promised
Redwood a great run.14 Indeed, such was
the importance of Eurosceptic organis-
ations that both candidates met the 92
Group on the eve of the election although
the occasion “passed off uneventfully.” 15
Major won the contest with 218 votes to 89
but the gamble had not worked. The size of
Redwood’s vote meant that there were many
storm clouds ahead.
with most Eurosceptic MPs between 1993-
97, Holmes cannot recall anyone intimating
that they simply wanted to “get rid of
Major.” 20 These recollections suggest, there-
fore, that sceptic motivations were not
based primarily on differences of person-
ality but on a question of policy towards
Europe.
By coming face-to-face with groups and
putting himself up for re-election, Major
had tried to address divisions. In October,
this theme continued with an arranged
meeting with Goldsmith at the Party
Treasurer, Charles Hambro’s flat, following
an impromptu tête à tête at Margaret
Thatcher’s birthday celebrations at Clar-
idges. This meeting did not extract from
Major an early commitment to a refer-
endum on the single currency but it did
demonstrate the perceived importance of
Goldsmith as “why otherwise would they
have met?” 21 With enormous personal
wealth, connections galore, a fanatical
attitude against Europe and an intention to
stand candidates against Tories, the threat
was obvious. Further correspondence was
exchanged in March 1996 by telephone and
letter bringing agreement “that Europe
should be built around the nation state” but
again nothing on a referendum.22
Goldsmith had also been busy meeting
other political figures. He met Lamont at
the Dorchester and at Wilton Place in early
1996.23 In April, he also had a meeting with
Redwood at Claridges.24 Most significantly,
he wrote to all Tory candidates, whether
inside or outside the House, and a number
of Labour ones telling them the only way to
avoid a Referendum Party candidate
standing in their constituency would be to
commit themselves to an immediate
referendum on the single currency.25 This
led to a great deal of angst amongst Tory
MPs with small majorities.
One of the oft-repeated criticisms of
Major was that he chose not to command
the decision-making process in Cabinet as
his predecessor had done. At times, how-
ever, the course of events was not in his
control. On 25 March 1996, the EU Veter-
inary Committee imposed a temporary ban
on the export of British beef products to the
rest of the world following the publication
of the possible link between Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and
Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease (CJD). This
The leadership election had brought
up an important question; was sceptic
opposition to Major based on personality as
much as policy? The Times’ Peter Riddell
observed that “some are motivated by hatred
of John Major: some by their passionate
opposition to the European Union.” 16 Alan
Clark has reflected that opposition was
based on policy before personality as, quite
simply, sceptics wanted Major to jump off
the proverbial fence on Europe.17 Addition-
ally, hardly any of the Referendum Party
candidates came out of the Conservative
Party. For them, “some intra-Tory Party
conflict was not the cause of what they were
doing.” 18 All other organisations have also
strongly refuted accusations that they felt an
animus first and foremost against Major.
The Bruges Group has pointed out that
many of their associates, like Lamont and
Duncan, were actually part of the campaign
team in 1990 that put Major into power.
Their resentment was not personal but
based on a feeling that he had sided with
‘enthusiasts’.19 Similarly, in conversation
Sceptic motivations were
not based primarily on
differences of personality
but on a question of policy
towards Europe
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decision caused outrage in the Conservative
Party and further inflamed British opinion
against the EU with the virtual closure of
the beef industry.26 Subsequently, on 21
May, Major decided that Britain would
withhold consent from EU decisions that
required unanimous approval until a
compromise on the beef problem had been
reached. This issue, additionally, only
served to increase the vehemence of Euro-
sceptic attitudes towards Europe.
By 1996, The Bruges Group had begun to
reconsider their attitude towards Europe.
Whereas the policy of reform of the EU had
been articulated (and the EU flag had flown
on platforms) in the early 1990s, it was now
accepted that if a full renegotiation of
Britain’s involvement with Europe was not
possible then Britain ought to withdraw
altogether.27 Thatcher also spoke out about
the importance of sceptic organisations and
the necessity to fund them. In June, 74
backbench Tories also supported Bill Cash’s
Referendum Bill, which called for “a
plebiscite on whether Britain should retain its
powers of government and not become part
of a federal Europe or join a single currency.”
Summer 1996 marked the last-ditch
attempt by Major to resolve rifts. His
reshuffle, however, started inauspiciously.
In July, the Paymaster General, David
Heathcoat–Amory, resigned, convinced
that “joining a single currency would be
disastrous both politically and economically
… and the Government’s equivocation on
this issue is confusing to the public and our
supporters.” 28 Like Lamont before him, he
immediately joined all sceptic organisations
and The Bruges Group launched his pam-
phlet, A Single European Currency: Why the
United Kingdom must say ‘No’ at his resign-
ation speech. Major, though, did promote
sceptics to positions of authority in a recon-
ciliatory gesture. The most notable was
Fresh Start member Roger Knapman, the
future chairman of UKIP, who became
Senior Whip “because of European convict-
ion rather than talent.” 29 Nevertheless, the
Party continued to be “seen as deeply
divided and incapable of governing.” 30
While Major toiled under the full glare of
the media, Eurosceptic organisations con-
tinued to advance their aims in an organ-
ised fashion. In October, the Referendum
Party held the largest conference of any
political party in Brighton with nearly 6,000
people in attendance. There, Goldsmith
outlined plans to stand at least 400
candidates at the next election.31 CWF, in
the autumn issue of its magazine, Forward,
also argued that if “the majority of Tory
candidates in winnable seats pledge in their
own personal election addresses that they will
fight against a Single Currency in the lifetime
of the next Parliament … then it will be
obvious to voters that no Tory Cabinet could
ever recommend such a sell-out to
Parliament.” 32
When Conservative Central Office finally
published election addresses over 100
contained a commitment that the candidate
concerned would not sign up to a single
currency. Considering that the Cabinet had
announced on 3 April that the Tories would
hold a referendum on the euro, these declar-
ations “made a mockery of any attempt to
find a common approach.” 33 Eurosceptics
and the Tory press were unimpressed by the
referendum decision and “kept hammering
on … to secure sworn testimony from Major
that he would not enter EMU.” 34 In
December, the 92 Group adopted a similar
position, despite the intervention of
Heseltine,35 with an announcement that
“this is not an economic issue. If you believe
in a sovereign Britain you must be against the
single currency.” 36 In April 1997, Marcus
Fox, Chairman of the 1922 Committee,
joined the rebels when stating, “I am totally
opposed to a federal Europe, and our national
identity must be maintained at all costs.” 37
These sentiments were taken up in Cabinet
by Howard, Lilley and other Eurosceptic
Ministers38 and Major was forced to modify
the Tories’ position on Europe approving
the Daily Telegraph headline ‘Major plans to
hold out against the Euro’.39
Two weeks before the final contest, Blair
announced that, “there are two Conservative
Parties fighting this election. John Major is in
charge of neither of them.” 40 The truth was
that there were far more than two
organisations fighting over Tory voters.
First, sceptic, but not necessarily enthusiast
Conservative, parliamentary organisations
fought to keep the Tories in power.
Secondly, non-party organisations also
involved themselves in the electoral process
but only in an indirect sense. The Bruges
Group “did not tell members how to vote” but,
when pressed on the subject by adherents,
Holmes did suggest that it depended on the
constituency: “If I was living in Grimsby, I’d
obviously vote for the Labour Eurosceptic,
Austin Mitchell. If I lived in Ludlow, I’d vote
for the Tory, Chris Gill. If I lived in a
constituency where the Tory was a Heathite
and the Labour candidate was a federalist,
then I might look at the candidates of the
Referendum Party and UKIP.” 41 This was a
For both parties, however,
the mere fact that Major
had decided to commit to
a referendum on the single
currency was perceived as
the greatest success of
their involvement in the
political scene
pragmatic approach aimed at making the
Group’s overwhelming Conservative mem-
bership reflect on Europe, not party politics.
Thirdly, there were sceptic parties, which
involved themselves in the contest directly.
The impact of Eurosceptic parties in the
1997 general election was limited. In the
run-up to the contest, this factor was a
source of much irritation for the
Referendum Party. Lamont has suggested
that, “if Goldsmith had wanted to succeed he
should have done more to get daily coverage
… in newspapers and on TV.” 42 However,
the simple fact remained that the Tory press
saw the Referendum Party as a threat to the
Conservative voter base and would not
positively report on its actions.43
Additionally, Goldsmith took the BBC to
court claiming that it should have been
granted the same number of party political
broadcasts as the main parties.44 Ultimately,
the Party had to create its own publicity
networks through the local press, by
sending out 750,000 videotapes to the
general public and by compiling a database
of some 250,000 individuals.45 It eventually
stood 445 candidates with estimated overall
costs of between £20–30 million.46 The
Party, though, won no seats with 2.86 per
cent of the national vote and lost 403
deposits.47 This percentage may not seem
significant but was, in fact, far greater than
the standard return for sceptic parties at
previous contests. The figure was also
crucial in a number of marginal seats.
Although this remains debatable, it is
estimated that the Referendum Party’s
intervention contributed to the loss of up to
50 Tory seats.48 UKIP, too, with 183
candidates won no seats and less than 0.4
per cent of the national vote. For both
parties, however, the mere fact that Major
had decided to commit to a referendum on
the single currency – as Labour and the
Liberal Democrats did subsequently – was
perceived as the greatest success of their
involvement in the political scene.
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Ultimately, however, the battle of ideas
boiled down to the sentiments of a single
group on Europe – the British. Both sides of
the divide claimed to represent the true
convictions of this sphere. Sceptic organis-
ations even unequivocally declared that “the
main task was to convert the Tory party-base
to Euroscepticism.” 49 In a specific sense, Tory
voters did feel more passionately about the
concept of losing national sovereignty. A
1996 poll showed that whereas only 42 per
cent of Labour supporters were concerned
about such an outcome, 61 per cent of
Conservatives were.50 UKIP knew of these
statistics and felt Europe “was certainly one
of the main issues for lots of Tories.” 51 Their
reasoning that the decrease in Party mem-
bership and full-time agents over the 1990s
also mirrored party-base concern with the
Party’s approach to Europe, though, stretch-
ed the argument too far.52 Membership may
have dropped from 750,000 to 300,000
between 1990 and 1997 but this was a
downward trend that had begun in the mid-
1950s when membership was at 3 million.
Similarly, this was a universal trend as
Labour membership had also decreased
over this period. The consequences of
desertions were, nevertheless, felt in other
areas.
committee rooms were left unmanned and
understrength.55 For example, in Sutton and
Cheam, the Referendum Party campaign
was said to have been “considerably more
impressive” than that of the sitting Tory MP,
Olga Maitland, who duly lost.56
Conclusion
In a more general sense, there has also been
an ongoing polemic about whether the
British general public really cared about
Europe to the extent that sceptic organis-
ations thought they did. In reflection,
Holmes believed that both the sceptics and
enthusiasts incorrectly thought that people
regarded Europe as the number one issue.
In his words, “this was not actually true and
this was a lesson for both sides … as it did not
affect their [the public’s] material interest.”57
Furthermore, he believed that the whole
question of the single currency had been
effectively ring-fenced by Tory and Labour
commitments to hold a referendum, which
allowed “people to consider housing, the
health service, employment, inflation, etc.
instead.” 58Others, however, have argued to
the contrary. Roger Knapman accepted that
“people will always talk about education,
health and the economy” but “they also care
about the future of the country.” 59 Away from
generalisms, Lamont has recalled that
“people on doorsteps” often quizzed him over
Europe but that parliamentary arguments
made the Conservative Party “appear a one-
issue party unconcerned with other areas.” 60
Overall, as Major has stated, “voters expect
unity and punish division.” 61
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Don’t Mention the War:
The British and the Germans since 1890
John Ramsden, Little, Brown, 2006, 433 pp,
ISBN 13 978 0 316 86122 9, £20.00
Reviewed by David Wilson
The 2006 World Cup, of sad andinfamous memory, began with one
dim-witted wiseacre announcing, “That,
within living memory, having beaten the
Germans twice at their national game and
once at our own; it is high time we beat them
again at ours.” Yet, the World Cup ended
with most English fans supporting
Germany and not just because they were
playing Argentina. Outside the ground at
the Germany v. Argentina quarter-final a
group of English fans spotted an Argentine
news crew (complete with the obligatory
bronzed anchorman with regulation slicked
back glossy hair) and immediately struck
up the chant ‘Malvinas Anglettere’.
Incongruously, this was taken up by the
massed ranks of Germans and sung with
cheerful abandon all through the bierkeller-
fuelled night. This fellow feeling was not
unreciprocated throughout the rest of the
competition, even the latest variation on a
hardy perennial joke, “Who do you think you
are kidding, Mr Klinsmann,” fell a little flat.
The vast majority of England fans support-
ed Germany against the eventual winners
Italy in the semi-final. Well, didn’t that feel
strange.
Well, that’s enough about football (for the
time being). Don’t Mention the War is a
better book than some of its reviewers have
given it credit; not that it has been meanly
reviewed, far from it. Professor John
Ramsden, the distinguished historian of the
Conservative Party,1 has written a witty and
provocative thesis on our German problem
(and, in the process, the Germans’ English
problem). Why does Britain – or, again,
more accurately, England – have such a
problem with the greatest Central European
power? The question, of course, virtually
answers itself. Professor Norman Stone, our
most eminent historian of Mitteleuropa,
when asked to explain the moral catas-
trophe of the first half of the European 20th
Century, retorted in just four simple words
– and with some singular emphasis, “The.
Germans. Went. Ape”. Stürm und Drang was
not the half of it. Or, as our more prosaic
football fans would have it, “Two World
Wars and One World Cup.”
intellectual cache; breakthroughs in the
natural sciences were universally admired;
philosophy and literature were succès
d’estimes; and opera, orchestral music and
the performing arts were genuinely and
widely enjoyed. This sense of cultural affin-
ity was accentuated by successive Germanic
monarchs succeeding to the British throne
(despite the fact that a few of them did not
even speak the King’s English on their
coronation). Needless to say, this admir-
ation was not universal. While Carlyle
regarded “Germanhood all along as a
quality, not a fault,” Macaulay disparaged the
German philosophical mindset – he had
particular dislike for Hegel – and sneered,
“An acre of Middlesex is better than a
Principality in Utopia.”
With Bismarck’s unification of a Ger-
many in the mid-19th Century, Prussian
militarism came to dominate the new Great
European Power. This cuckoo in the nest of
the heartland of Europe upset the balance
of power on the continent which – even
before the Congress of Vienna – it had been
British policy to maintain. Yet it was only
when the hubris of Wilhelmine imperial
ambition led Germany to challenge the
Royal Navy’s rule of the world’s waves – a
struggle that led to the first modern arms
race – that things started to get nasty. This
problem of preventing a hegemon assum-
ing suzerainty on continental Europe is the
same problem that every British statesman
from Castlereagh to Palmerston to Sir
Edward Grey has faced.
Grey put it like this, “If the German fleet
ever becomes superior to ours, the German
army can conquer this country. There is no
corresponding risk of this kind to Germany.”
The naval theorist, Admiral Alfred T.
Mahan, used to argue that given that the
seas and the great oceans are continuous
and uninterrupted and given that sea
transport was more effective than land
transport, whoever controlled the sea, and
was possessed of an insular and defensible
home nation, would ascend to primacy in
world affairs. Though not formulated at
such a theoretical level, this was roughly the
view of Her Majesty’s Government, whereas
Sir Halford Mackinder based his theory of
primacy on land domination: “Who rules
East Europe commands the Heartland; Who
rules the Heartland commands the World-
Island; Who rules the World-Island
commands the world.” 2 This was roughly the
view of the Wilhelmine General Staff.
These strategic concerns were given
dramatic popular expression with the
Professor Ramsden’s question is also a
more specific one: will we ever forgive the
Hun? In one sense, Germany has become so
neutered and quiescent in geopolitical
terms that it has virtually disappeared off
the British radar. If anything, despite the
obligatory and admittedly tiresome auto-
dictat jokes regarding Teutonic militarism,
we now tend to criticise contemporary
Germany for its neutralism, if not down-
right pacifism. However, there are strategic
stirrings in Mitteleuropa and, despite
appearances to the contrary, neither of
these countries lives merely through their
shared pasts of mutual loathing or merely
through the displacement activity of war by
other means that is international football.
Enmity is the order of the day, but it was not
always like this.
In 1881, The Times declared in a fit of
Teutonic fellow feeling (based on an
assumed common racial ancestry) that,
“Germany does not excite in any class
amongst us the slightest feeling of distrust or
antipathy.” Indeed, British attitudes towards
Germany excited no great antipathy until
the Edwardian Era and even then Germanic
high culture was still hugely admired: the
new Rilkean historiography had particular
Germany has become so
neutered and quiescent in
geopolitical terms that it
has virtually disappeared
off the British radar… We
now tend to criticise
contemporary Germany
for its neutralism, if not
downright pacifism.
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publication of Erskine Childers’ sensational
thriller, The Riddle of the Sands (1903).
Childers’ book, which caused something of
a mass Greuelpropoganda at the time,
concerns two Englishmen on a yachting
expedition, sailing among the shifting sands
of the German Baltic coast, who chance
upon preparations for an imminent
invasion of England. The Riddle of the Sands
is a call to arms; a desperate plea for
England to reassert its own war readiness.3
After 1870 and the Franco–Prussian War
which the Germans won with embarrassing
ease, there had been the greatest of Great
Power European stand-offs with Germany
the dominant force on the land and Britain
on the high seas. As Ramsden accurately
points out, “Once Germany acquired a battle
fleet only a day’s steaming from Britain’s
undefended East coast that balance was
terminally destabilised.” There was now a
driving panic to build ever-bigger capital
ships of the gargantuan Dreadnought class
to protect these islands from the imminent
threat emanating from the North Sea. It was
in this atmosphere that the demagogic
chant went up across the land, “We want
eight (Dreadnoughts) and we won’t wait.”
These sentiments might have been
jingoistic, but strategically they were sound.
The Kaiser could be conciliatory,
proclaiming to British listeners at a 1901
dinner, “We ought to form an Anglo–German
alliance, you keep to the seas while we would
be responsible for the land.” All the worst
fears of the earlier invasion scares were con-
firmed when in December 1914 German
battle cruisers shelled Whitby, Scarborough
and Hartlepool, killing 133 civilians.
Shocking as they were to the British public’s
psyche (like the 1,413 killed in Zeppelin
raids) these atrocities, would have been far
worse were it not for the fact that the
German Admiralty – not unlike the British
– realised they could lose the war in one day
after a single disastrous naval engagement,
so they put into port and never came out
again en masse.
This arms race set off the ticking bomb
that ended exploding all over the fields of
the Somme, Ypres and Paschendale. And
God bless the bloody infantry, yet even in
the first Christmas of the conflagration, that
of 1914, the Bosch and the Allgemeines
squaddies famously found time to play
football against each other across no-man’s
land – until the officer class put a stop to it
for fear of encouraging fraternisation with
the enemy. Inevitability, by 1914 Wilhel-
mine Germany was seen as a threat to West-
ern civilisation; the Germany of Goethe and
Beethoven had metastasised into the
barbarian Hun. The Anglican Church was
preaching from its national pulpit that, “We
are the preordained instruments to save the
Christian civilisation of Europe from being
overrun buy a brutal and ruthless paganism.”
It was certainly during this period that
Rudyard Kipling summed up the sentiment
of the people when he wrote, “When the
English begin to hate …” Ford Maddox
Hueffer went further, “I wish Germany did
not exist, I hope that it will not exist much
longer. Burke said that you cannot indict a
whole nation. But you can.” Writing
prematurely of their defeat in 1914 G.K.
Chesterton excommunicated the entire
German nation from Christendom, “the
empire of blood and iron rolled slowly back
towards the darkness of the northern forests.”
Then suddenly, after four years of hatred,
came the Armistice.
romantic Germanophilia and returned yet
again to the idealisation of the likes of Goe-
the and Beethoven. Robert ‘Van’ Vansittart
(then the government’s chief diplomatic
adviser, though a notable Germanophobe)
was incapable of comprehending the totali-
tarian nature of Hitler’s National Socialism,
believing it was just the latest sinister
manifestation of Junker militarism. Worse,
Keynes was a romantic Germanophile who
was not only hopelessly naïve regarding the
true nature of the Nazi state, but also about
the extent of its enthusiastic popular sup-
port. Bernard Morris points out that of the
thousands of articles on Germany in the
British press published in the 1930s, no
more than 25 attempted to define, explain
or analyse Nazi ideology. Nevertheless,
amongst the ranks of the ruling class there
was at least one exception – at the time a
man of Kent – to virtually all these general-
isations.
In the age of total war this Armageddon
was a moral crusade to specifically rid
Europe of Hitler’s New Order. Nevertheless,
this time there was also almost a presumpt-
ion of the collective guilt on behalf of the
German people. Just how much were the
German people collectively guilty; to what
degree were they complicit in the regime as
Hitler’s Willing Executioners? In the after-
math of the liberation of the death camps,
the Political Warfare Executive announced
what was effectively a verdict of German
‘exceptionalism’; that is to say, “The moral
responsibility for these crimes should be laid
wholly and solely at the German nation.” The
German population, the nation itself, was
held not to be passive victims of the Third
Reich, but the active perpetrators of
unspeakable war crimes.4 It is arguable that
if you wanted a lasting peace you needed to
have one militarily and judicially imposed
by a Nuremberg; rather than one reluctantly
signed up to at a Versailles. It was once said
of Prussia that it was a not a country with an
army, but an army with a country. Similarly,
under the Nazis, Germany was not a
country governed by a dictatorial part, but
a dictatorial governing party that had
become the country. Though A.J.P. Taylor
almost certainly went too far in his 1973
Creighton Lecture when he declared that,
“the gas chambers represent Germany as
truly as Gothic Cathedrals represented the
civilisation of the Middle Ages.”
The sheer variety of English nomen-
clatures for the Germans are indicative:
Krauts, the Bosch, Jerries and the Hun. It is
fair to say that these designations and even
After the much-maligned Treaty of
Versailles, it was Britain that infamously
burdened itself with ‘war guilt’. It was
preeminetly the British – in contrast to the
fallen empires and war ravaged nations of
continental Europe – that saw the Treaty as
unjust, as a punitive peace. In The Economic
Consequences of the Peace (1919), John
Maynard Keynes represented not only
progressive and pacifist opinion, but also, to
a degree, popular sentiment. It was nothing
short of astonishing that soon after 1918
both the British public and the British
political establishment were prepared to
forgive and forget. Versailles was increasing-
ly seen as an ill-judged and unjust expres-
sion of Gallic vindictiveness. Tragically, it
was this sense of moral culpability in the
‘Carthaginian Peace’ that was to lead
directly to Appeasement. By the 1930s the
ruling classes – after the slaughter of their
first born (and everyone else’s) – had
reverted to their default position of the
After the much-maligned
Treaty of Versailles, it was
Britain that infamously
burdened itself with ‘war
guilt’. It was preeminetly
the British that saw the
Treaty as unjust, as a
punitive peace.
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less contumely and mannered ones, are
universally hostile. At the time, the attitude
of that everyman, the post-war Foreign
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who famously
remarked to General Robertson, “I tries
’ard, Brian, but I ’ates ‘em” was typical. As
you might expect, Noel Coward – who must
stand as Bevin’s almost too perfect alter ego
– expressed what he termed “being beastly to
the Germans” rather more elegantly, “They
gave us culture, science, art, and music – to
excess/They also gave us two world wars and
Mr Rudolph Hess.”
Ramsden appears to argue that this
adversarial pas de deux came to a head over
the post-war German Federal Republic’s
Sonderweg, Wirtschaftswunder and Ost-
politik and that, in that most clichéd of
metaphors, Britain missed the European
bus. More convincingly he argues that con-
fronted with this all too ostentatious success
story and the refrain of “Who won the war
anyway” – brilliantly dramatised in the
Seventies by Auf Weidersen Pet, the subtle
Dick Clements and Ian La Frenais scripted
television comic drama, portraying unem-
ployed Geordie builders moonlighting in
Hamburg to escape the domestic dole
queues – the victory over Nazism became a
culture of consolation for relative industrial
decline. This found its xenophobic release
mainly in popular culture; particularly, in
television programmes such as Auf Wieder-
sehen Pet as well as Dad’s Army, ’Allo, ’Allo
and, of course, Basil’s immortal goose step-
ping mental breakdown in Fawlty Towers –
from which Ramsden takes his title. Not
discounting countless tabloid headlines
about Teutonically efficient tourists mount-
ing dawn raids on our Costa del Sol sunbeds
and, last but certainly not the least of it, the
ever-growing deification of the boys of ’66.
Ramsden’s book is witty and well
observed, but overly and overtly po-faced.
In short, he would like us all to grow up and
stop making Molesworth-like schoolboy
jokes about the Germans. If only it was as
simple as that. After all, no one intelligent is
in favour of petty nationalisms. The trouble
is it is not just Molesworth; long before the
demented man-child was terrorising St
Custards with all his brilliant adolescent
inanities, the Comte de Mirabeau stated,
“La guerre est l’industrie nationale de la
Prusse” (War is the national industry of
Prussia). They have given up on war, but
still seem determined to ascend to primacy
in Europe by other means. Germany now
tries to control its sphere of influence in
Central Europe by exercising a not wholly
benign form of ‘soft power’ through the
agency of a supranational European state
with itself at the epicentre. This will con-
tinue to create its own problems. Perhaps
our attitudes to our German cousins are
changing, not least a degree of amicability
over a century long football rivalry, after all
this is such a very special relationship; but
then, perhaps not – though I am a well-
known pessimist.
1 Ramsden’s books on the Tories include: 3
volumes in the Longman History of the
Conservative Party – Volume 4: The Age of
Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (1978),
Volume 5: The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-
57 (1995), Volume 6: Winds of Change:
Macmillan to Heath (1996) together with
Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party
Europe After the ‘No’ Votes
Professor Patrick A. Messerlin, Institute for Economic Affairs, 2006, 96 pp, £10.00
Reviewed by Carlo Stagnaro
Policy: The Conservative Research Department
since 1929 (1980), Ramsden, The Real Old Tory
Politics: The Political Diaries of Sir Robert
Saunders, Lord Bayford, 1910-1935 (1984) and
Ramsden, An Appetite for Power: A History of
the Conservative Party Since 1832 (1998).
2 The ‘World-Island’ refers to the Eurasian
landmass or continent. Mackinder was one of
the founders of the London School of Eco-
nomics and its Director from 1903 to 1908.
3 Childers was a Protestant Irishman, with the
start of the war he joined the Royal Navy as
an Intelligence Officer and was active in the
North Sea and Dardanelles. He as awarded
the DSO and promoted to Lieutenant Com-
mander by 1916. However, the suppression of
the Easter Rising incensed him and Childers
became an even more vehement Irish
nationalist. Though he was the Secretary-
General of the delegation that negotiated
the Anglo-Irish Treaty, he rejected the final
draft that required Irish leaders to take an
Oath of Allegiance to the British King. He was
executed for treason by the pro-Treaty Free
State government at Beggar’s Bush Barracks,
Dublin in 1922.
4 See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996);
Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve
Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in
Poland (London: Penguin, 2001) and Raul
Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders:
Jewish Catastrophe (London, Harper Collins,
1993). These books are also a useful
corrective to the John Maynard Keynes
Popular Front line presuming the lack of
support amongst the German people for the
Nazi state.
David Wilson is a Neoconservative member
of the Labour Party. He is a frequent
contributor to the European Journal and is
writing a book on the Congress for Cultural
Freedom and the Cultural Cold War.
Is the European dream over? That iswhat many thought after the French and
the Dutch voted against the proposed
European Constitution. In Europe After the
‘No’ Votes, Professor Patrick A. Messerlin
argues that the rejection of the Constitution
shows that the path towards a European
super-state is the wrong one. However, there
is still a need for a common economic
agenda for the future of the European
Union.
Messerlin, an economist at the Institut
d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, believes that,
“the French referendum makes it clear that
the hodgepodge of issues referred to during
the campaign as the ‘social model’ should
remain matters of strictly national
competence.” To put it otherwise, the
European social model is not European at
all – let alone social. People in Member
States think that the welfare state, labour
Ramsden’s book is witty
and well observed… In
short, he would like us all
to grow up and stop
making Molesworth-like
schoolboy jokes about
the Germans.
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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
From Professor Antony Flew
Dear Editor,
The case for Gordon Brown as the
successor to Tony Blair as Prime Minister
might be greatly strengthened if only he
would reveal whether and, if so, by what
arguments, Tony Blair persuaded him to
From Dr Charles Hanson
Dear Ms Rainwater,
Thank you for including in the last issue
of The Journal the excellent article by
Douglas Carswell, MP, Why Britain Must
Quit the EU.
At last some of the more intelligent
Conservative Members of Parliament have
taken the point made by Margaret Thatcher
four years ago in her book Statecraft, when
she wrote, “as I shall seek to show, Europe
as a whole is fundamentally unreformable”
(p 321).  Douglas Carswell’s piece is a re-
freshing contrast to those who continue to
assume that Margaret Thatcher was wrong
and that reform is possible, despite the
massive accumulation of evidence to the
contrary.  I hope that we can look forward to
more articles supporting the case for our
exit from the EU.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Charles Hanson
regulations, etc., are their own business and
there is no need to harmonise them at the
European level. If that is the real message
underlying the French ‘Non’, then it is
correct to question the path of intensive and
pervasive regulation followed by Brussels
over the last few years.
Originally, as evidenced by the Treaty of
Rome, the unification of the old continent
was a visionary project that set a political
goal (peace) to be achieved through
economic means (free market). Hence,
Messerlin suggests that the liberalisation
and integration of European markets into
one single market should be taken seriously.
That requires common efforts towards
reforms, both at the national and European
level. The trick is not to take anything for
granted. So, Messerlin argues that reform
should start with the creation of a single
market for goods, which “would exhibit two
features: regulations in all the member states
would be roughly equally pro-competitive
(reflecting intra-EU openness) and they
would tend to be less restrictive than those of
the other OECD countries (mirroring extra-
EU openness).” If Europe is strong enough to
pursue the creation of a single market in
most sectors, it will gather substantial
benefits.
That is true also of the ‘sacred cow’ of
European politics, i.e. agriculture: “if there is
one good sector in which the single market’s
progress depends heavily on multilateral
trade opening,” says Messerlin, “It is
agriculture… The Common Agricultural
Policy has systematically prevented the
emergence of pan-European farm markets
because its subsidies and price supports
protect each member state’s inefficient
farmers from more efficient ones, be they
from foreign countries or from other member
states.”
Likewise, there is also a lot to do in regard
to the single market in services: “the welfare
gains to be expected from an open single
market in services are huge.” The challenge
was tentatively addressed by the so-called
Bolkestein Directive which faced unprece-
dented opposition across the Member
States. Messerlin writes, “opposition to the
Directive is much broader because its wide
sectoral scope (a key asset from an economic
perspective) has produced heavy political
costs by uniting a huge number of monopolies
or collusive firms all over Europe.” But
“opposition to the Directive has focused on
the PCO” [principle of country of origin],
which is a minor – although crucial – part
of the Directive itself.
demand from rent seekers and those willing
to defend protected positions, it will
ultimately be rejected as people realise they
get less benefits than costs from Brussels.
The paradox is that “today, nobody in Europe
seriously promotes an alternative plan to a
market-based economy. But that leaves an
endless number of battles on very specific
topics that powerful coalitions of NGOs and
private vested interests present disin-
genuously as limits to the market model.”
Messerlin’s work is followed by three
commentaries. Pedro Schwartz, an econo-
mist from the Universidad San Pablo CEU
in Madrid, argues that the key is “the
widening and full application of the freedoms
of the Treaty of Rome: the free circulation of
persons, services, goods and capital.” Former
member of the European Commission Lord
Brittan of Spennithorne, while generally
agreeing with Messerlin, sets forth a few
disagreements concerning the possibility of
achieving radical reforms in a complex
world, where for example countries such as
the US deploy sometimes higher tariffs than
Europe itself. Historian John Gillingham,
from the University of Missouri–St Louis,
questions the ability of Member States to
work out a common strategy towards
reforms: “the only European consensus
existing today is on doing nothing… In a
globalising world economy driven by Chinese
modernisation and American innovation,
Europe will simply count for less.”
Carlo Stagnaro is Free Market Environ-
mentalism Director of the Istituto Bruno
Leoni, Italy’s free market think tank –
www.brunoleoni.it.
From  Sir Oliver Wright
Dear Miss Rainwater,
Congratulations on the conference
edition of the European Journal. A bumper
number if there ever was one. Well done.
Yours,
Oliver Wright
agree to the abandonment of the enormous
reduction in the amount of the UK’s annual
contribution to the European Union
secured by Margaret Thatcher.
Yours,
Antony Flew
In Messerlin’s view, the
future of Europe lies in its
ability to return to its
fundamental principles.
The Union can survive only
insofar as it can deliver
greater economic benefits
to its citizens.
In Messerlin’s view, the future of Europe
lies in its ability to return to its fundamental
principles. The Union can survive only
insofar as it can deliver greater economic
benefits to its citizens. If instead it micro-
manages the market, while meeting the
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Toby
Morison
C H U N N E L
V I S I O N
50 Things
I Won’t Do
if Elected Mayor
of London
by Dr Lee Rotherham
It is customary for politicians tomake five election pledges that they
subsequently break. You know the type –
education, education, education; no trash-
ing of the NHS; no land wars in the Middle
East; that sort of thing.
As a new age politician, here are fifty
things instead that you’ll never catch me
doing if you elect me to the job of Mayor of
London.
1 Invite Fidel Castro over for tiffin
2 Order people not to flush theirtoilets
3 Introduce a window tax for CanaryWharf
4 Nationalise garden gnomes
5 Invite Ikea to run Tate Modern
6 Turn the GLA building into a giantnewtarium
7 Ban cheeseburgers
8 Tow an iceberg up the Thames
9 Annex Essex
10 Apologise personally for anythingdone in history, e.g. the Boudiccan
Revolt or South Sea Bubble
11 Put up a giant statue in TrafalgarSquare of a penguin with a banjo
12 Send a special envoy to Pyongyangas part of a foreign policy for the
capital
13 Export for ‘inclusiveness’ purposesthe Notting Hill Carnival to
Yellowknife, North West Territories
14 Build a hydroelectric dam atChiswick
15 Post the Elgin Marbles to Greece
16 Rename Waterloo Station after theindefatigable Mr Saddam Hussein
17 Tax beards
18 Explore for oil in the wilds ofBattersea
19 Measure exactly the Square Mile
20 Turn the South Bank into a giantThunderbirds theme park, with
revolving shrubbery
21 Annoy the Americansunnecessarily
22 Dig a moat around the M25
23 Sell off Tower Bridge to joinLondon Bridge in Arizona
24 Allow Japanese trawlers into theLondon Aquarium
25 Put a windmill on Nelson’s Column
26 Outlaw Beefeaters on Health andSafety grounds
27 Compère a game show
28 Use cockney rhyming slang morethan official guidelines permit
29 Erect a bouncy peace castle onParliament Square
30 Give Oxford Street’s pavement acycle lane
31 Take out all the books from theBritish Library in one big loan and
forget to return them
32 Put obligatory eel pie on schools’dinners
33 Enrich plutonium
34 Reemploy the London Dungeon
36 Construct a space station in a PPPwith Drax Enterprises
37 Allow giant apes to clamber upmajor public buildings
37 Instruct Tower Hamlets to join theeurozone
38 Arm traffic wardens as an urbanparamilitary
39 Open a Starbucks in BuckinghamPalace
40 Initiate a Gumball Rally for stretchlimousines down the Old Kent
Road
41 Build a matching MillenniumDome for the sake of symmetry
42 Run a mobile command centrefrom a bendy bus
43 Install a shower at the DianaMemorial
44 Attempt to clone the contents ofthe Natural History Museum
45 Privatise the London Undergroundto a coal mining consortium
46 Sell the ravens at the Tower to anEdgar Allan Poe exhibition
47 Move my office across to theconning tower at HMS Belfast and
reactivate the ship
48 Allow chariot racing aroundPiccadilly Circus
49 Shut down The Mousetrap if theyrefuse to change it to a comedy
musical
50 Increase the Congestion Charge forperforming midgets in exploding
clown cars
Dr Lee Rotherham is a declared candidate for
the Conservatives’ London Mayoral Prim-
aries. The candidate’s real policies can be
found at www.newstartforlondon.com
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